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EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION AGAINST
SUBSTANCE ABUSERS: THE FEDERAL
RESPONSE
Since colonial times, employers in the United States have sought
to control the use of alcohol and other drugs' by their employees. 2
Awareness of and concern over substance abuse dramatically in-
creased during the late 1980s. 5 The increase was fueled, in part, by
the striking nature of several workplace incidents related to sub-
stance abuse.4 For example, in 1986, a string of Conrail locomotives
collided with an Amtrak train, killing sixteen people; the Conrail
employees who were operating the locomotives at the time of the
accident tested positive for marijuana. 5 Four years later, in 1990,
three Northwest Airlines pilots were convicted of flying a jetliner
while under the influence of alcohol. 6
The response of the federal government to the problem of
substance abuse in the workplace has been ambivalent. On the one
hand, in 1988 Congress passed the Drug-Free Workplace Act, which
requires federal contractors and grantees to adopt a policy prohib-
iting the possession or use of illegal drugs in the workplace and to
sanction employees who violate that policy.' On the other hand, in
the mid-1970s the federal government recognized that, at least in
some instances, the Rehabilitation Act of 19'73 prohibited employers
from discriminating against substance abusers. 8
The Rehabilitation Act ("Act") prohibits discrimination on the
basis of disability by federal employers, contractors and grantees. 8
Although alcohol is a drug, this note will distinguish, as courts and statutes typically
have, between alcohol and other drugs.
Genevieve M. Ames, Alcohol-Related Movements and Their Effects on Drinking Policies in
the American Workplace: An Historical Review, 19 J. DRUG Issues 489, 491-93 (1989). Ames
notes that colonial workers, whose wages were often alcoholic beverages supplied during the
workday, fiercely resisted efforts by employers to limit workplace drinking. Id. at 491-92.
3 Ste Steven W. Gust & J. Michael Walsh, Research on the Prevalence, Impact, and Treatment
of Drug Abuse in the Workplace, in DRUGS IN THE WORKPLACE: RESEARCH AND EVALUATION
DATA, NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON DRUG ABUSE MONOGRAPH 91 I, 1 (Steven W. Gust & J.
Michael Walsh eds., 1989).
▪ See id.
N.Y. Ttmes, Jan. 15, 1987, at Al. The tests did not indicate whether the employees
had been using marijuana at the time of the accident or were longtime users. Id.
• N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 1990, at Al.
7 Pub. L: No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4307 (1988) (codified at 42 U.S.C.S. if 701-706 (Law.
Co-op. Supp. 1990)).
▪ 29 U.S.C. H 701-796 (1988).
• See id. H 791, 793, 794.
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After the United States Attorney General and the judiciary inter-
preted the Act's definition of "individual with handicaps"'° to en-
compass substance abusers, Congress passed an amendment that
expressly addresses the protection of substance abusers under the
Act." The amendment excludes from the Act's definition of "indi-
vidual with handicaps" those individuals whose substance abuse
impairs their performance or threatens public safety or property.' 2
In determining which substance abusers the Act protects, some
courts have concluded that, under the amendment, substance abu-
sers must meet the same requirements for protection as individuals
with other disabilities." Other courts have held that the amendment
imposes an additional, and unique, requirement upon substance
abusers seeking protection under the Act."
Because substance abuse often differs from other types of dis-
abilities, treating substance abusers and individuals with other dis-
abilities similarly is sometimes difficult. In many instances, an em-
ployee who is a drug abuser is engaging in illegal activity." Also,
detoxification and rehabilitation often entail extended absences
from work." In addition, the high rate of relapse among recovering
substance abusers means that a single, finite act by the employer,
such as building a wheelchair ramp, will rarely solve the problem."
In July, 1990, President Bush signed into law the Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA"), a comprehensive prohibition
against discrimination on the basis of disability.' 8 In the employment
10 Except in discussions of the interpretation of the term "individual with handicaps"
under the Rehabilitation Act, this note will use the phrase "individuals with disabilities" to
refer to individuals potentially covered by federal legislation prohibiting discrimination on
the basis of disability.
" See Pub. L. No. 95-602, § 122, 92 Stat. 2955, 2984-85 (1978) (codified at 29 U.S.C.
§ 706(8)(B) (1988)). See infra notes 106-42 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
application of the Act's definition of "individual with handicaps" to substance abusers. See
infra notes 143-60 and accompanying text for a discussion of the amendment and its history.
12 29 U.S.C. * 706(8)(B) (1988).
15 See, e.g., Copeland v. Philadelphia Police Dep't, 840 F.2d 1139, 1148-49 (3d Cir.
1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1004 (1989); Wallace v. Veterans Admin., 683 F. Supp. 758, 762-
64 (D. Kan. 1988).
14 See, e.g., Heron v. McGuire, 803 F.2d 67, 68-69 (2d Cir. 1986); Burka v. New York
City Transit Auth., 680 F. Supp. 590, 596-601 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
15 See Federal Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. 11 812 (1988).
16 See Diana Chapman Walsh, A Randomized Trial of Treatment Options for Alcohol-Abusing
Workers, 325 NEW ENG. J. , MED. 775, 775 (1991); George E. Vaillant, What Can Long-term
Follow-up Teach Us About Relapse and Prevention of Relapse in Addiction, 83 BRIT. J. ADDICTION
1147, 1199 (1988).
17 See Vaillant, supra note 16, at 1149.
15 Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990).
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area, the ADA prohibits private employers with fifteen or more
employees from discriminating against qualified individuals with
disabilities. 19 Like the Rehabilitation Act, the ADA contains provi-
sions that focus upon substance abusers. 2° For example, the ADA
provides that both the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA protect only
former users of illegal drugs.21 The ADA, however, leaves unclear
whether courts should hold substance abusers to the same, or to a
different, standard than they hold individuals with other disabili-
ties. 22
This note will discuss the problem of substance abuse in em-
ployment and will explore the protections from employment dis-
crimination available to substance abusers under both the Rehabil-
itation Act and the ADA.. Section I of this note provides a brief
overview of the scope of the problem of substance abuse in em-
ployment and the nature of recovery from substance abuse." Sec-
tion II reviews generally the anti-discrimination provisions of the
Rehabilitation Act, the regulations implementing those provisions,
and the theory underlying the prohibition of discrimination based
on disability. 24 Section III explores the specific protections that the
Rehabilitation Act's anti-discrimination provisions offer substance
abusers." This section includes a discussion of the courts' attempts
to create guidelines delineating the duty of employers under the
Rehabilitation Act to accommodate employees with substance abuse
problems. 26 Section IV reviews the employment discrimination pro-
visions of the ADA, with special emphasis upon the provisions con-
cerning substance abuse.27 Section V draws on the note's discussion
of the Rehabilitation Act to analyze the degree of protection af-
forded substance abusers under the Rehabilitation Act, and to cri-
tique the ADA's attempt to address the problem of substance abuse
in employment. 28 This note concludes that, although both the Re-
habilitation Act and the ADA leave the courts free to hold substance
19
 See id. §§ 101(5), IO2(a). The ADA's prohibition on employment discrimination on
the basis of disability takes effect on July 26, 1992. Id.
	
108. Until July 26, 1999, the
prohibition only applies to employers with twenty-five or more employees. Id. 101(5)(a).
'° See id. 1111 104, 510.
21 Id. §§ 104(a)—(b), 512.
22 See infra notes 334-37 and accompanying text.
23 See infra notes 29-45 and accompanying text.
21 See infra notes 50-105 and accompanying text.
25
 See infra notes 106-270 and accompanying text.
23 See infra notes 203-63 and accompanying text.
27 See infra notes 271-319 and accompanying text.
25 See infra notes 320-52 and accompanying text.
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abusers to a higher standard than individuals with other disabilities
in order to receive protection under federal laws prohibiting em-
ployment discrimination, courts should hold substance abusers and
individuals with other disabilities to the same standard.
I. SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND EMPLOYMENT
In a report submitted to Congress in 1990, Acting Surgeon
General James 0. Mason estimated that approximately 10.5 million
adults in the United States showed signs of alcoholism. 29 A 1987
survey of treatment centers for substance abuse found that, during
the year ending October 30, 1987, 830,000 individuals were treated
for substance abuse. 3° For employers, the costs of substance abuse
can be high. The value of lost employment and reduced productiv-
ity caused by alcoholism alone in 1986 was estimated at over $64
billion. 3 '
" James 0. Mason, Preface to NATIONAL INST. ON ALCOHOL ABUSE AND ALCOHOLISM,
U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, SEVENTH SPECIAL REPORT TO THE U.S. CONGRESS
ON ALCOHOL AND HEALTH FROM THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES at ix (1990)
(hereinafter SEVENTH SPECIAL REPORT]. As the report discusses, many diagnostic systems,
including the World Health Organization's 1978 International Classification of Diseases and the
American Psychiatric Association's 1987 Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders,
distinguish between alcoholism (alcohol dependence) and alcohol abuse. Id. at 3. Although
alcohol dependence, unlike alcohol abuse, involves physical dependence on alcohol, both
alcohol dependence and alcohol abuse impair the individual's ability to function socially and
vocationally. Id. Most, if not all, of the cases and statutes discussed in this note refer to
individuals with alcohol problems as alcoholics without discussion of the distinction between -
alcohol dependence and alcohol abuse.
'1) NATIONAL INST. ON DRUG ABUSE AND THE NAT'L INST. ON ALCOHOL ABUSE AND
ALCOHOLISM, U.S. DEPT. or HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, NATIONAL DRUG AND ALCOHOLISM
TREATMENT UNIT SURVEY: 1987 SPECIAL REPORT 24 (1987) [hereinafter TREATMENT UNIT
SURVEY].
91 See SEVENTH SPECIAL REPORT, Supra note 29, at ix; see also MARK A. ROTHSTEIN,
MEDICAL SCREENING AND THE EMPLOYEE HEALTH COST CRISIS 98 (1989) (alcoholism and drug
addiction cost American business ninety-nine billion dollars annually); BOSTON GLOBE, Sept.
12, 1991, at Al (alcoholism costs U.S. economy more than forty-four billion dollars annually
in diminished production and treatment costs). For a criticism of attempts to measure the
cost in lost productivity of alcohol abuse, see Richard M. Weiss, Determining the Effects of
Alcohol Abuse on Employee Productivity, 40 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 578, 578 (1985).
In a survey conducted in New England during the 1980's, thirteen percent of the
respondents reported that they had gone to work at least once in the previous month under
the influence of alcohol or "hung over," and two percent reported that they went to work
under the influence of alcohol or hung over at least once a week. Ralph W. Hingson et al.,
Employee Drinking Patterns and Accidental Injury: A Study of Four New England States, 46 1 STUD.
ON ALCOHOL 298, 300 (1985). The same survey found that, even if employees do not drink
while at work, those employees who average five or more drinks daily are significantly more
likely than employees who do not drink to have an accident requiring medical attention.
Other studies have found that employees who tested positive for drugs at the time of their
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Although many substance abusers seek treatment, 32 a signifi-
cant majority of substance abusers relapse. Many substance abusers
relapse several times. 33 One study found, for example, that ninety-
five percent of the heroin addicts and alcoholics followed in the
study had relapsed within two years of undergoing treatment, and
that the average alcoholic in the study had been detoxified fifteen
times in an eight-year period.54 The same study noted, however,
that the number of subjects who reached stable abstinence increased
over time. 55
The author of that study theorized that, for substance abusers,
avoiding relapse is related to the degree of structure in the sub-
stance abuser's life." That structure may come from the close su-
pervision of an employer or from other activities, such as Alcoholics
Anonymous or Narcotics Anonymous membership." A group of
social scientists studying the relationship of the work environment
to alcoholism have similarly suggested that a highly structured work
environment helps prevent relapse." For example, they argue that
employment that does not include travel promotes recovery from
alcoholism because it allows the individual to attend regularly meet-
ings of a support group and reduces the number of times that the
individual socializes with people unaware of his or her alcoholism."
The job characteristics that the authors list as conducive to recovery
application for employment had higher absenteeism rates than other employees, were more
likely to be dismissed than other employees, and were involved in more on-the-job traffic
accidents than other employees. See Dennis J. Crouch et al., A Critical Evaluation of the Utah
Power and Light Company's Substance Abuse Management Program: Absenteeism, Accidents and Costs,
in DRUGS IN THE WORKPLACE, supra note 3, at 181-86; Jacques Normand & Stephen Salyards,
An Empirical Evaluation of Preemployment Drug Testing in the United States Postal Service: Interim
Report of Findings, in DRUGS IN THE WORKPLACE, supra note 3, at 128-31.
52 See TREATMENT UNIT SURVEY, supra note 30, at 24 (surveyed treatment units reported
treating over 830,000 individuals for substance abuse in year ending October 30, 1987);
BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 12, 1991, at Al (1.4 million Americans are in alcoholism treatment at
any given time).
" Vaillant, supra note 16, at 1148.
" Id. at 1148-49.
" Id. at 1149; see also Walsh, supra note 16, at 778 (alcoholics undergoing treatment all
showed "substantial and sustained improvement" in job functioning, regardless of treatment
type).
" Vaillant, supra note 16, at 1155-56.
sro /d. at 1153-55.
38 See Russel M. Newton et al., The Role of Structured Work in Alcoholism Rehabilitation, J.
REHABILITATION, Oct.—Dec. 1988, 63, 63-64. The authors' theory is that a highly structured
work environment rewards abstinence and punishes drinking and drinking-related behaviors
more consistently than does a relatively unstructured work environment. Id. at 64.
39 Id. at 65-66.
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include set hours, required attendance and a high degree of ac-
countability.°
Additionally, a recent study suggests that substance abusers who
start their treatment with intensive inpatient care are less likely to
relapse. 4 ' The study, which focused on alcoholic workers, found
that individuals whose treatment began with three weeks of inpa-
tient care, followed by compulsory attendance at Alcoholics Anon-
ymous, were twice as likely to have been continuously abstinent for
two years than individuals whose treatment consisted solely of par-
ticipation in Alcoholics Anonymous. 42 The group whose treatment
began with inpatient care also had only a third the rate of subse-
quent alcoholism-related hospitalization as did the Alcoholics Anon-
ymous group." Those alcoholics in the study who also used cocaine
similarly fared better when assigned initially to hospital treatment,
rather than Alcoholics Anonymous or Narcotics Anonymous." Be-
cause the individuals who received hospital treatment initially were
less likely to relapse or need subsequent hospital care, the cost of
treatment for those individuals was ultimately only ten percent more
than the cost for individuals who initially participated only in Al-
coholics Anonymous.°
In sum, the effect of substance abuse upon employees is a costly
problem for their employers. Even if employees with substance
abuse problems seek treatment, the probability of relapse is high.
Recent studies have suggested, however, that the rate of relapse
may be lessened by adding structure to the employee's work envi-
ronment and by beginning treatment for substance abuse with hos-
pitalization.
II. THE REHABILITATION ACT OF 1973
Substance abusers seeking employment often confront signifi-
cant social and psychological barriers.° Many employers refuse to
hire employees who are substance abusers or who have a history of
substance abuse due to the employer's belief that substance abusers
40 Id. at 65 .
" Walsh, supra note 16, at 778.
42 Id.
's Id.
44 Id. at 778-79.
45 Id. at 779-80.
46 Michael W. Fortier, Employment Discrimination against Alcoholics and Drug Addicts: The
Federal Response, CONTEMPORARY DRUG PROBS., Spring 1982, at 39,48.
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are poor employment risks who are_ not worthy of any investment
in job training.47 During this century, however, a number of medical
and psychological authorities have recognized substance abuse as a
disease." Relying in part upon those designations of substance
abuse as a disease, Attorney General Griffin Bell declared, in 1977,
that the anti-discrimination provisions of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973 protected substance abusers.°
The primary purpose of the Rehabilitation Act is to authorize
rehabilitative programs for individuals with disabilities. 50 These pro-
grams help individuals with disabilities find work, live indepen-
dently and participate in their communities. 51 To further the objec-
tives of the programs, the Act includes provisions that grant
individuals with disabilities some of the same protections accorded
victims of sex and race discrimination by the Civil Rights Act of
1964. 52
Sections 501, 503 and 504 of the Rehabilitation Act contain its
anti-discrimination provisions." Section 501(b) requires federal ex-
ecutive agencies to take affirmative action to employ and advance
individuals with disabilities; section 503(a) makes a similar require-
mentof contractors when performing federal contracts worth more
4 7 Id.
45 See, e.g., AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS 165 (3d rev. ed. 1987) (continued use of psychoactive substances leading to social,
occupational, psychological or physical problems is mental disorder); WORLD HEALTH ORG.,
MENTAL DISORDERS: GLOSSARY AND GUIDE TO THEIR CLASSIFICATION IN ACCORDANCE WITH
THE NINTH REVISION OF THE INTERNATIONAL CLASSIFICATION OF DISEASES 43 (1978) (physical
and psychological need to use alcohol or drugs continuously or periodically is mental disor-
der).
49 43 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 12, 6 (Apr. 12, 1977).
5° See H.R. REP. No. 244, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. I (1973), reprinted in 1973 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2076, 2076 (1973). Congress enacted the Rehabilitation Act to replace the Vocational Reha-
bilitation Act. Id.
51 29 U.S.C. § 701 (1988).
52 Id. §* 791, 793, 794; see AISO UNITED STATES COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, ACCOMMODAT-
ING THE SPECTRUM OF INDIVIDUAL ABILITIES, CLEARINGHOUSE PUBLICATION 81 49 (1983).
Following the practice of the majority of the courts and commentators, textual references in
this note to the anti-discrimination provisions of the Rehabilitation Act will use their session
law section numbers. Citations will be to the United States Code.
Section 504 of the Act, which prohibits discrimination by federal grantees on the basis
of disability, was initially proposed as an amendment to title VI of the Civil Rights Act. 118
CONG. REC. 9712 (1972) (remarks of Rep. Vanik); 118 CONG. REC. 525-26 (1972) (remarks
of Sen. Humphrey). Both Representative iVanik and Senator Humphrey indicated that
section 504 was equivalent to their proposed amendment to the Civil Rights Act. 119 CONG.
REC. 7114 (1973) (remarks of Rep. Vanik); 119 CONG. REC. 6145 (1973) (remarks of Sen.
Humphrey).
55 29 U.S.C. § 791(b), 793(a), 794(a) (1988).
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than $2,500. 54 Courts and administrative agencies have interpreted
these affirmative action provisions as implicitly prohibiting discrim-
ination." Section 504(a) makes no reference to affirmative action,
but it does prohibit any program or activity that receives federal
financial assistance from discriminating against otherwise qualified
individuals solely on the basis of their disabilities. 56 The Act's anti-
discrimination provisions do not specifically , apply to private em-
ployers. The federal contractors and grantees covered by the pro-
visions, however, may comprise at least half of all private employers
in the United States. 57
" Section 501(b) provides that:
Each department, agency and instrumentality (including the United States
Postal Service and Postal Rate Commission) in the executive branch shall .
submit to the [Equal Employment Opportunity] Commission and to the [Inter-
agency Committee on Handicapped Employees] an affirmative action program
plan for the hiring, placement, and advancement of individuals with handicaps
in such department, agency, or instrumentality.
29 U.S.C. § 791(b).
Section 503(a) provides that:
Any contract in excess of $2,500 entered into by any Federal department or
agency for the procurement of personal property and nonpersonal services
(including construction) for the United States shall contain a provision requiring
that, in employing persons to carry out such contract, the party contracting with
the United States shall take affirmative action to employ and advance in em-
ployment qualified individuals with handicaps . . . .
29 U.S.C. $ 793(a).
55 See UNITED STATES COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 52, at 54-55 (citing Shirley
v. Devine, 670 F.2d 1188, 1200-04 (D.C. Cir. 1982)).
" Section 504(a) provides that:
No otherwise qualified individual with handicaps in the United States . . . shall,
solely by reason of her or his handicap, be excluded from the participation in,
be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program
or activity receiving Federal financial assistance or under any program or activity
conducted by any executive agency or by the United States Postal Service.
29 U.S.C. $ 794(a).
The Supreme Court has held that, under section 504, individuals may bring employment
discrimination claims against federally funded programs even if the primary objective of the
federal assistance is not to 'provide employment. Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 465
U.S. 624, 635 (1984). The Darrone Court, relying on Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555
(1984), also held that section 504 applied only to the specific program or activity that received
the federal funds. Id. at 635-36. In 1988, Congress amended section 504 to add a definition
of "program or activity" that overturned the Darrone Court's narrow interpretation of the
term. 3 CHARLES A. SULLIVAN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 26.1.1, at 2122 (2d ed.
1988) [hereinafter EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION]. See 29 U.S.C. 1 794(6) (1988) for the text
of the amendment.
57
 One commentator has estimated that section 503 alone covers approximately half of
all businesses in the United States. Forcier, supra note 46, at 40. Judicial construction of the
statute, however, has limited the coverage of the Act's anti-discrimination provisions in some
instances. See generally EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION, supra note 56, at 26, 27, 29. For
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A commentator writing several years after the passage of the
Rehabilitation Act noted that the courts had yet to explore the
unique problems of prohibiting discrimination on the basis of dis-
ability.58 Because an individual with a disability is often unable to
perform certain tasks, the models of discrimination developed in
response to discrimination based on sex, race or ethnic group do
not always readily transfer to instances of discrimination based on
disability.59 In the case of sex, race or ethnic group discrimination,
the characteristic provoking the discrimination has no bearing on
the individual's ability to perform the duties of the job. 6° Where
individuals with disabilities are victims of discrimination, however,
the characteristic that leads to discrimination—the disability—does
sometimes impair the individual's ability to perform job duties. 6 '
In response to the difference between discrimination based on
disability and discrimination based on sex, race or ethnic group, the
administrative agencies and courts that implemented and inter-
preted the Rehabilitation Act developed the concept of "reasonable
accommodation." 62 A reasonable accommodation is a modification
in the way that a job is performed that allows an individual with a
disability to perform the job duties.° Examples of reasonable ac-
commodations include making facilities readily accessible, restruc-
turing jobs, modifying work schedules, acquiring or modifying
equipment or devices, and hiring readers or interpreters."
example, the Supreme Court has held that section 504 applies only to direct recipients of
federal funds because only those recipients are in a position to decide whether to accept the
federal funds. United States Dep't of Tramp. v. Paralyzed Veterans, 477 U.S. 597, 605-06
(1986).
56 See Mark E. Martin, Note, Accommodating the Handicapped: The Meaning of Discrimination
Under Section 304 of the Rehabilitation Act, 55 N.Y.U. L. Rxv. 881, 888 (1980).
63 Id. at 883-84.
" See id. at 883.
61 See id. In his preface to regulations proposed to implement section 504, the Secretary
of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare made the same point:
The premise of both title VI and title IX is that there are no inherent differences
or inequalities between the general public and the persons protected by these
statutes and, therefore, there should be no differential treatment in the admin-
istration of Federal programs. The concept of section 504, on the other hand,
is far more complex. Handicapped persons may require different treatment in
order to be afforded equal access to federally assisted programs and activities,
and identical treatment may, in fact, constitute discrimination.
41 Fed. Reg. 20,296 (1976).
52 See generally UNITED STATES COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 52, at 102-14.
63 MASSACHUSETTS COMM'N AGAINST DISCRIMINATION, MASSACHUSETTS COMM'N AGAINST
DISCRIMINATION'S GUIDELINES: EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF HANDICAP—
CHAPTER 151B at 5 (1986); see also Martin, supra note 58, at 885-86.
" 45 C.F.R. 84.12(b) (1989).
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The concept of reasonable accommodation first appeared in
the Department of Health, Education and Welfare ("HEW") regu-
lations implementing section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. 65 The
1977 regulation required that programs receiving federal funds
make reasonable accommodation to the known disabilities of oth-
erwise qualified applicants or employees. 66 One year later, the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), which was re-
sponsible for implementing section 501, and the Department of
Labor ("DOL"), which was responsible for implementing section
503, issued similar regulations that required federal employers and
federal contractors to make reasonable accommodations to the dis-
abilities of employees and applicants. 67
Two years after HEW issued its reasonable accommodation
regulation, the United States Supreme Court, in Southeastern Com-
munity College v. Davis, stated that the refusal of a federally funded
program to make modifications to meet the needs of an individual
with a disability might, in some circumstances, violate section 504
of the Rehabilitation Act." In Davis, the Court held that a nursing
program's refusal to admit a deaf applicant did not violate section
504. 69 The Court, noting that section 504, unlike sections 501 and
503, does not require affirmative action, concluded that section 504
does not require recipients of federal funds to modify their pro-
65 UNITED STATES COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, suPra note 52, at 102.
66 42 Fed. Reg. 22, 677 (1977) (codified at 45 C.F.R. II 84.12 (1989)). The regulation
provides that "[al recipient shall make reasonable accommodation to the known physical or
mental limitations of an otherwise qualified handicapped applicant or employee unless the
recipient can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the
operation of its program." Id. See infra notes 77-80 and accompanying text for a discussion
of the definition of "otherwise qualified." HEW was redesignated the Department of Health
and Human Services by the Department of Education Organization Act. 20 U.S.C. li 3508
(1988).
67 See 43 Fed. Reg. 49,278-79 (1978) (codified at 41 C.F.R. I/ 60-741.6(d) (1990)) (federal
contractors covered by section 503 must make a reasonable accommodation to the disabilities
of employees or applicants unless they can demonstrate that the accommodation would
impose undue hardship on their business); 43 Fed. Reg. 12,295 (1978) (codified at 29 C.F.R.
§ 1613.704 (1990)) (federal agencies covered by section 501 must reasonably accommodate
known disabilities of qualified employees or applicants unless the agency can prove that the
accommodation would impose undue hardship on the operation of the program). Although
Congress never incorporated the reasonable accommodation regulations into the anti-dis-
crimination provisions of the Rehabilitation Act, it did provide in a 1978 amendment to the
Act that courts could consider the reasonableness of the cost of needed accommodations and
the availability of any alternatives to the accommodation or other appropriate relief in order
to achieve an equitable and appropriate remedy for violations of section 501. Pub. L. No.
95-602, § 120, 92 Stat. 2982 (1978) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 794(a)(1) (1988)).
68 See 442 U.S. 397, 412-13 (1979).
69 Id. at 414.
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grams to meet the needs of individuals with disabilities." In light
of evidence demonstrating that the school would have to modify
the clinical component of its program to provide extensive personal
supervision for the applicant if she was to satisfy the clinical re-
quirement without endangering patients, the Court held that the
school's refusal to admit the plaintiff was not discriminatory:"
Despite its assertion that section 504 did not impose a duty
upon federal grantees to modify their programs to meet the needs
of individuals with disabilities, the Court also stated that situations
might exist where a refusal to modify requirements and practices
would be discriminatory. 72 The Court stated that if a program could
obtain, without an undue financial or administrative burden, tech-
nological devices that would allow individuals with disabilities to
participate in a program, refusal to obtain those devices might be
discriminatory." Although the Court couched its discussion of the
possibility that section 504 requires modifications in affirmative ac-
tion language, later commentators have concluded that the Court
was addressing the issue of accommodation. 74 In subsequent cases,
lower courts have recognized that the Rehabilitation Act imposes a
duty upon employers to make a reasonable accommodation to the
disabilities of employees and applicants."
Reasonable accommodation is integral to the determination of
which individuals with disabilities are protected under the Rehabil-
itation Act's anti-discrimination provisions. 76 According to the lan-
guage of those provisions and their implementing regulations, the
Act protects only those individuals with disabilities who are qualified
or otherwise qualified. 77 For example, section 504 prohibits federal
grantees from discriminating against an "otherwise qualified" indi-
vidual with a disability on the basis of his or her disability." In
72 Id, at 410-12.
71 Id. at 414.
72 Id. at 412-13.
" Southeastern, 442 U.S. at 412.
/1 See UNITED STATES COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 52, at 110-1 I; Martin, supra
note 58, at 885.
75 UNITED STATES COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 52, at 106.
75 Id. at 117.
77 See 29 U.S.C. § 793(a), 794(a) (1988); 29 C.F.R. § 1613.703 (1990), See generally
UNITED STATES COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 52, at 114-18.
' 8 29 U.S.C. 4 794(a). Section 503 of the Act prohibits discrimination by federal con-
tractors against "qualified individuals with handicaps." Id, § 793(a). The EEOC regulations
implementing section 501 prohibit federal agencies from discriminating against a "qualified
physically or mentally handicapped person." 29 C.F.R. § 1613.703.
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defining which individuals with disabilities are qualified or otherwise
qualified, the regulations implementing the Rehabilitation Act em-
ploy the concept of reasonable accommodation. 79 HEW, for exam-
ple, defines "otherwise qualified individuals with handicaps" as
those who can perform the essential functions of a job once the
employer makes a reasonable accommodation. 8° The anti-discrimination
protections of the Act, therefore, extend only to individuals with
disabilities who, given a reasonable accommodation, can perform
the essential functions of the job.
In Southeastern Community College v. Davis, however, the United
States Supreme Court suggested that the Rehabilitation Act does
not require employers to provide an accommodation that would
alter the fundamental nature of their business or would place an
undue financial or administrative burden upon them.'" As noted
above, the Davis Court stated that situations might exist where a
refusal to modify requirements and practices to meet the need of
an individual with a disability would be discriminatory. 82 In discuss-
ing those situations, the Court implied that employers have no duty
to make a modification that would alter the fundamental nature of
their business or place an undue financial or administrative burden
upon them. As an example of an accommodation that would alter
the fundamental nature of a program, the Court cited a modifica-
tion that would require an educational program to lower or sub-
stantially alter its academic standards. 83 Since Davis, the lower courts
have similarly held that section 504 does not require accommoda-
tions that would irrevocably change the nature of the program. 84
The regulations implementing the Rehabilitation Act's anti-
discrimination provisions further provide that employers have no
duty to accommodate where they can show that the accommodation
79 Id. § 1613.702(f); 45 C.F.R. 84.3(k)(1) (1989); 41 C.F.R. 60-741.2 (1990).
an 45 C.F.R. f 84.3(k)(1) (emphasis added). The EEOC regulations implementing section
501 use an almost identical definition. See 29 C.F.R. 4 1613.702(f) ("qualified individuals
with disabilities" are those able to perform essential functions of the job without endangering
themselves or others once the employer makes a reasonable accommodation). The section
503 regulations define "qualified employees with handicaps" as those capable of performing
a particular job, given a reasonable accommodation. 41 C.F.R. ft 60-741.2; see also Kohl by
Kohl v. Woodhaven Learning, 865 F.2d 930, 936 (8th Cir.) (" . if a handicapped individual
cannot be reasonably accommodated, then he cannot be otherwise qualified"), cert. denied,
110 S. Ct. 239 (1989).
" See Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 412-13 (1979).
°2 See supra text accompanying notes 68-73, for a discussion of this part of the opinion.
'3 Southeastern, 442 U.S. at 413.
84 See UNITED STATES COMM O N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 52, at 125.
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would impose undue hardship upon them." According to the reg-
ulations, whether an accommodation would impose undue hardship
depends upon the size of the employer, as reflected in its work
force, facilities and budget; the type of the employer's operation,
including the composition and structure of its work force; and the
nature and cost of the accommodation."
In 1981, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit held in Prewitt v. United States Postal Service that, in regard
to section 501, "undue hardship" requires more than de minimis
cost.87 The Postal Service had refused to hire the plaintiff in Prewitt
on the grounds that his inability to lift his left arm above his shoul-
der would prevent him from performing some of the duties of a
clerk/carrier, including heavy lifting." The Fifth Circuit remanded
the case for findings on the issue of the plaintiff's ability to perform
the duties of a clerk/carrier once the Postal Service made a reason-
able accommodation to his disability. 89 As it reviewed the principles
to be applied on remand, the court discussed the definition of
undue hardship."
In concluding that the section 501 definition of undue hardship
means more than de minimis cost, the Fifth Circuit relied heavily
on the congressional debate concerning a 1978 amendment to sec-
tion 501 of the Rehabilitation Act that created a private right of
action under section 501. 91 The court noted that during the floor
88 See 29 C.F.R. § 1613.704(a) (1990) (section 501 regulations); 41 C.F.R. f 60-741.6(d)
(1990) (section 503 regUlations); 45 C.F.R. II 84.12(a) (1989) (section 504 regulations).
86 See 29 C.F.R. 11 1613.704(c) (factors include number of employees, number and type
of facilities, size of budget, type of operation and nature and cost of accommodation); 41
C.F.R. 160-741.6(d) (factors include business necessity and financial cost and expenses); 45
C.F.R. II 84.12(c) (same as 29 C.F.R. 11 1613.704(c)). The United States Commission on Civil
Rights has interpreted the regulations to require consideration of non-financial factors, such
as the purpose and nature of the business, as well as the employer's resources and the cost
of the accommodation. UNITED STATES COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 52, at 127.
" 662 F.2d 292, 308 n.22 (5th Cir. Unit A Nov. 1981).
" Id. at 297, 299.
86 Id. at 309-10.
"° Id. at 305-10. The Prewitt court noted that the United States Supreme Court had, in
Trans World Airlines v. Hardison, previously interpreted the term "undue hardship." Id. at 308
n.22. In Hardison, the Court construed a provision of the Civil Rights Act that requires
employers to accommodate the religious practices of employees' unless the accommodation
would impose undue hardship. 432 U.S. 63, 84 (1977). The Hardison Court held that the
provision obligated employers to accommodate religious practices of employees only if the
cost of the accommodation was de minimis. Id. The Prewiu court expressly refused to apply
the Hardiso-n Court's definition of undue hardship to section 501. 662 F.2d at 308 n.22.
(11 Prewitt, 662 F.2d at 302-04, 308 n.22. The Prewitt court also referred to the regulation
issued under section 501 that lists factors important to the determination of whether an
accommodation would impose undue hardship on the employer. Id. at 308. See 29 C.F.R.
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debate on the amendment, Congress considered but rejected a sug-
gestion that it limit the federal government's duty of reasonable
accommodation under section 501.92 Specifically, Congress rejected
a proposal limiting the duty of reasonable accommodation to situ-
ations where the cost of the reasonable accommodation would not
disproportionately exceed the actual damages potentially available
in a discrimination suit. 93 The Fifth Circuit concluded that if Con-
gress was unwilling to eliminate the duty to accommodate even in
circumstances where the cost of the accommodation might exceed
the damages available in a lawsuit, Congress must have intended
"undue hardship" to mean something more than de minimis cost. 94
Commentators have suggested various standards for undue
hardship in section 504 cases." One commentator suggested that
an accommodation imposes an undue hardship on a federally
funded program if providing the accommodation would severely
impair the program's services. 96 For example, if the cost of making
a public transportation system totally accessible to individuals with
disabilities was high enough to endanger the survival of the public
transportation system, such accommodation would impose undue
hardship on the program. 97 This commentator argued that, in order
to fulfill the Rehabilitation Act's goal of integrating persons with
disabilities into society, a showing that an accommodation would be
costly should be insufficient to demonstrate undue hardship; in-
stead, the accommodation should be evaluated based on its effect
on the program." Another commentator claimed that undue hard-
ship results if the accommodation prevents the employer from ben-
$ 1613.704(c) ( l990) for the text of the regulations. The court stated that the EEOC regulation
accurately expresses congressional intent concerning "undue hardship." Prewitt, 662 F.2d at
309.
92 Id. at 308 n.22.
g' Id. Congress agreed to a compromise that allowed courts to consider the reasonable-
ness of the cost of an accommodation and the availability of alternative accommodations or
other appropriate relief when fashioning equitable or affirmative action remedies in section
501 actions. See 124 CONG. REC. 30,577-79 (1978). See 29 U.S.C. 794(a)(1) (1988) for the
text of the amendment that Congress ultimately adopted.
94 Prewiu, 662 F.2d at 308 n.22.
95 See UNITED STATES COMM O N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 52, at 127; Martin, supra
note 58, at 900-01.
" Martin, supra note 58, at 900-01.
97 Id. at 904.
99 Id. at 900-01. Cf Nelson v. Thornburg, 567 F. Supp. 369, 380 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (state
agency required to provide, blind welfare workers with accommodations including sighted
readers and braille forms because total cost of accommodations was small percentage of
agency's personnel budget); aff'd, 732 F.2d 146 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1188
(1985).
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efiting from the employee's work. 99 This latter commentator ac-
knowledged that a realistic assessment of the costs of
accommodation should include an assessment of the benefits to
persons with disabilities if the accommodation is made, as well as
the costs to persons with disabilities if the accommodation is not
made. '°°
In sum, the Rehabilitation Act prevents federal employers, con-
tractors and grantees from discriminating on the basis of disability.
Because disabilities, unlike race, gender and ethnic origin, impair a
individual's ability to work, the administrative agencies and courts
that have implemented and interpreted the Act have prohibited
employers from discriminating against only those individuals with
disabilities who are qualified or otherwise qualified. Individuals with
disabilities are qualified or otherwise qualified if they can perform
the job duties once an employer makes a reasonable accommodation
to their disability, such as purchasing Braille manuals for employees
with visual impairments. Employers are not required to make ac-
commodations, however, that alter the fundamental nature of their
business or impose undue hardship upon the employer.
III. THE REHABILITATION ACT AND SUBSTANCE ABUSE
Typically, plaintiffs seeking to establish a prima facie case under
the Rehabilitation Act's anti-discrimination provisions must show
that they fall within the Act's definition of "individual with handi-
caps,"'°' and that they are qualified or otherwise qualified.'" Plain-
tiffs must also show plausible reason to believe that a reasonable
accommodation to their disability exists. ws Once plaintiffs establish
99 UNITED STATES COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 52, at 127; see also, Judith Welch
Wegner, The AntiDiscrimination Model Reconsidered: Enduring Equal Opportunity Without Respect
to Handicap Under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 401, 481
(1984) (interpreting dicta of court in Upshur v. Love, 474 F. Supp, 332, 342 (N.D. Cal. 1979),
that school district would not be required to accommodate blind teacher by hiring aide to
perform virtually all teacher's administrative tasks as indication that court would not require
accommodation where costs of accommodation would greatly exceed benefits of employing
individual).
100 See UNITED STATES COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 52, at 127-28.
101 See, e.g., Copeland v. Philadelphia Police Dept, 840 F.2d 1139, 1148 (3d Cir. 1988),
cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1004 (1989); Guerriero v. Schultz, 557 F. Supp. 511, 513 (D.D.C. 1983).
1°R
	
e.g., Copeland, 840 F.2d at 1148; Pushkin v. Regents of Univ. of Colo., 658 F.2d
1372, 1387 (10th Cir. 1981).
193 See, e.g., Crewe v. United States Office of Personnel Management, 834 F.2d 140, 143
(8th Cir. 1987); Prewitt v. United States Postal Serv., 662 F.2d 292, 310 (5th Cir. Unit A Nov.
1981).
170	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW 	 [Vol. 33:155
a prima facie case, the burden of persuasion shifts to the employers
to show that accommodation is unreasonable. 104 If employers pres-
ent credible evidence that accommodation is not reasonable, the
burden shifts back to the plaintiffs to come forward with more
evidence that the accommodation is reasonable.'° 5
A. Substance Abusers as "Individuals with Handicaps"
To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the
Rehabilitation Act, therefore, substance abusers must first prove
that they fall within the Act's definition of "individual with handi-
caps." 1 °6 When passed in 1973, the Act defined "individual with
handicaps" as an individual who had physical or mental impair-
ments that constituted a substantial handicap to employment and
who could reasonably be expected to benefit from the vocational
rehabilitation programs provided for by the Act. 167 In 1974, Con-
gress amended the Act's definition of "individual with handicaps"
by adding a separate definition for the purposes of title V of the
Act, which includes its anti-discrimination provisions. 108 In amend-
ing the definition, Congress intended to make clear that the Act's
anti-discrimination provisions extend to all individuals with disabil-
ities, not only those who required rehabilitation, and to all areas,
not only employment.' 09
The definition as amended provides that the Act's anti-discrim-
ination provisions cover three types of individuals with disabilities:
individuals with physical or mental impairments that substantially
limit one or more of their major life activities, individuals who have
a record of such an impairment, and individuals who are regarded
1 °4 See, e.g., Prewiti, 662 F.2d at 310; Whitlock v. Donovan, 598 F. Supp. 126, 137 (D.D.C.
1984), of 'd mem. sub nom. Whitlock v. Brock, 790 F.2d 964 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
105 See Prewiti, 662 F.2d' at 310. Courts have employed several variations of the allocation
of the burden of proof outlined in the text. See, e.g., Sisson v. Helms, 751 F.2d 991, 992-94
(9th Cir. 1985); Doe v. New York Univ., 666 F.2d 761, 776-77 (2d Cir. 1981); Pushkin, 658
F.2d at 1385; Doe v. Centinela Hosp., No. CV 87-2514 PAR, 1988 WL 81776 (C.D. Cal.
June 30, 1988). See generally Wegner, supra note 99, at 475-81; Kevin Baker-Kamalay, Note,
Employment Discrimination against the Handicapped: An Analysis of Statutory and Constitutional
Protections in Massachusetts, 21 NEW ENG. L. REV. 305, 329-34 (1985-86).
108 Set, e.g., Copeland, 840 F.2d at 1148; Pushkin, 658 F.2d at 1387.
"" Pub. L. No. 93-112, (I 7, 87 Stat. 359 (1973) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
706(8)(A) (1988)).
108
	 L. No. 93-516, tit. I, § 111(a), 88 Stat. 1619 (1974) (codified as amended at 29
U.S.C. 706(8)(B) (1988)).
09 See S. REP. No. 1297, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 37-38, 64 (1974), reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6373, 6388-89.
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as having such an impairment."° The Act leaves undefined several
of the definition's key terms. The agencies charged with enforcing
the Act, however, have issued regulations that define the terms
"physical or mental impairment,""' "substantially limits,"" 2 "major
life activities,""s "have a record of,"" 4 and "regarded as.""s
110 29 U.S.C. 11 706(8)(B) (1988). For a general discussion of the scope of the term
"individual with handicaps," see David A. Larson, What Disabilities Are Protected Under the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973?, 16 MEM. Sr. U. L. REV. 229 (1986).
11 "Physical or mental impairment" is defined for the purposes of section 504 as:
any physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical
loss affecting one or more of the following body systems: neurological; mus-
culoskeletal; special sense organs; respiratory, including speech organs; cardi-
ovascular; reproductive, digestive, genito-urinary; hemic and lymphatic; skin
and endocrine; or any mental or psychological disorder, such as mental retar-
dation, organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and specific learn-
ing disabilities.
45 C.F.R. f 84.3(j)(2)(i) (1989). The EEOC regulations implementing section 501 use the
same definition. See 29 C.F.R. § 1613.702(b) (1990).
"5 Section 504 regulations do not define the phrase "substantially limits" because HHS
does not believe a definition is possible at present. 45 C.F.R. §11 4 app. A, 11 3 (1989). In its
regulations implementing section 503, the DOL describes "substantially limits" as a matter
of degree. 41 C.F.R. 11 60-741 app. A (1990). Under the DOL regulations, an individual with
disabilities who is "likely" to experience difficulty in securing, retaining or advancing in
employment has an impairment that substantially limits the major life activity of working.
Id. See Doe v. Centinela Hosp., No. CV 87-2154 PAR, 1988 WI 81776 (C.D. Cal. June 30,
1988), for a review of Rehabilitation Act cases discussing whether exclusion from a single
job or program constitutes a substantial limitation on major life activities. Increasingly, courts
have concluded that "substantially limits" requires more than adverse employment action by
a single employer. See, e.g., McCleod v. City of Detroit, 39 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 225,
227-28 (E.D. Mich, 1985) (dismissal of firefighters for marijuana use not violation of Reha-
bilitation Act because working as firefighter was not major life activity). But see Andrew W.
Haines, E.E. Black, Ltd. v. Marshall: A Penetrating Interpretation of "Handicapped Individual"
for Sections 503 and 509 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and for Various State Equal Employment
Opportunity Statutes, 16 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 527, 543-47 (1983) (arguing that "substantially
limits" must be defined to include impairment of opportunity to obtain a specific job in order
to fulfill the purposes of the Act).
" 3 Section 504 regulations define "major life activities" as functions such as caring for
one's self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning
and working. 45 C.F.R. f 84.3(j)(2)(ii) (1989); see also 29 C.F.R. if 1613.702(c) (1990) (same
definition used by EEOC under section 501); 41 C.F.R. § 60-741 app. A (1990) (DOL's
section 503 regulations define major life activities to include activities such as communication,
ambulation, self-care and employment).
1 " Section 504 regulations define "has a record of" as "has a history of, or has been
misclassified as having, a mental or physical impairment that substantially limits one or more
major life activities." 45 C.F.R. f 84.3(j)(iii) (1989); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1613.702(d) (1990)
(same definition under section 501); 41 C.F.R. § 60-741 app. A (1990) (under section 503,
individuals who have a record of an impairment are those who are completely recovered
from previous impairments and those who have been misclassified as having an impairment).
"5 Section 504 regulations define "regarded as" as meaning that the individual:
(A) has a physical or mental impairment that does not substantially limit major
life activities but that is treated by a recipient as constituting such a limitation;
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Two years after Congress amended the Act's definition of "in-
dividual with handicaps," the Secretary of HEW requested com-
ments from interested parties on proposed regulations intended to
implement section 504. 116 The proposed regulations expressly in-
cluded substance abusers in the definition of "individual with hand-
icaps" for the purposes of section 504.' 17
 The comments submitted
to HEW raised three arguments against the Secretary's inclusion of
substance abusers within the definition.'" First, critics contended
that substance abuse was not a disability, because it was self-in-
flicted."9
 Second, the commentators worried that the inclusion of
substance abusers would disturb the Act's focus on "traditional"
disabilities. 12° Finally, commentators worried that drug abusers
would disrupt programs administered by federal grantees. 12 '
(B) has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits major life
activities only as a result of the attitudes of others toward such impairment; or
(C)has none of the impairments [listed in the definition of 'physical or mental
impairment'] but is treated by a recipient as having such an impairment.
45 C.F.R. 84.3(j)(iv) (1989); .tee also 29 C.F.R. 1613.631(a) (1990) (same definition under
section 501); 41 C.F.R. 60-741 app. A (1990) (under section 503, individuals regarded as
having an impairment are thOse who are perceived by their employers as having an impair-
ment).
118 41 Fed. Reg. 20,296 (1976). Although section 504 did not authorize the promulgation
of regulations to implement its provisions, the Senate suggested in a report that regulations
were intended and that the President assign HEW the responsibility for coordinating the
enforcement of section 504. See S. REP. No. 1297, 93d Congress, 2d Sess. 40 (1974), reprinted
in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6373, 6390-91. In April, 1976, President Ford issued Exec. Order No.
11,914, 41 Fed. Reg. 17,871 (1976), the first official action taken to implement section 504.
See RICHARD B. CAPALLI, FED GRANTS & CO-OP AGREEMENTS § 20.07, at 20-19 (Callaghan
1982). The order required the Secretary of HEW to issue regulations to guide the determi-
nation of which individuals section 504 protected and which actions section 504 prohibited.
41 Fed. Reg. 17,871 (1976). The order also called for any federal department or agency
providing federal financial assistance to issue regulations consistent with the regulations
promulgated by HEW. Id. One month after Ford's order, HEW issued proposed regulations
for its grantees. See 41 Fed. Reg. 20,295 (1976). The revision of those regulations followed
two months later, 41 Fed. Reg. 29,548 (1976), and HEW issued the final regulations in May,
1977. 42 Fed. Reg. 22,676. In 1978, HEW, drawing heavily upon its regulations for its
grantees, issued model regulations, 43 Fed. Reg. 2132, for other federal departments and
agencies. CAPALLI, Pra, § 20.08, at 20-20. That same year, President Carter transferred
coordination of employment discrimination coverage under the Rehabilitation Act to the
EEOC. Exec. Order No. 12,067, 43 Fed. Reg. 28,967 (1978). In 1980, President Carter again
transferred the responsibility for coordinating employment discrimination coverage, this time
to the Department of justice. Exec. Order No. 12,250, 45 Fed. Reg. 72,995 (1980).
117
 41 Fed. Reg. 20,298 (1976).
"8 Id. at 29,548-49 (1976).
118 Id. at 29,548. Cf. Traynor v. Turnage, 485 U.S. 535, 551 (1988) (upholding Veterans
Administration determination that, at least in some instances, substance abuse is voluntary
and thus not a disability for purpose of extending time limit to exhaust G.I. Bill benefits).
128
 41 Fed. Reg. 29,548-49 (1976).
121 Id. at 29,549.
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In 1977, Attorney General Griffin Bell, responding to a request
from the Secretary of HEW, issued an opinion that concluded that
the 1974 definition of "individual with handicaps" included alco-
holics and other drug abusers.' 22 In the opinion, Attorney General
Bell addressed the criticisms of the proposed regulation.'" To rebut
the contention that substance abuse was not a disability, the Attorney
General pointed to the substantial body of medical and psycholog-
ical authority asserting that substance abuse is a disease.'" Second,
the Attorney General cited the legislative history of the Rehabilita-
tion Act to show that Congress intended to include substance abu-
sers in the definition of "individual with handicaps." 125 Third, the
Attorney General explained that recipients of federal funds would
be able to exclude disruptive substance abusers from their pro-
grams, because the regulations only prohibited discrimination
against otherwise qualified individuals with disabilities.' 26 The At-
torney General indicated that the Act did not prohibit federal gran-
tees from excluding substance abusers if the manifestations of their
substance abuse resulted in impaired performance or violations of
reasonable rules established by the program."' After receiving the
Attorney General's opinion, the Secretary of HEW issued the final
regulations.'" An explanatory statement that accompanied the final
regulations stated that, for purposes of section 504, the definition
of "individual with handicaps" included substance abusers. 129
In 1978, one year after the Secretary issued the regulations,
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Penn-
sylvania held in Davis v. Bucher that the Rehabilitation Act's defini-
tion of "individual with handicaps" encompassed individuals with
histories of drug use.'" In Davis, the City of Philadelphia rejected
the plaintiffs' applications for various city jobs solely because they
had previously used drugs."' None of the plaintiffs was using illegal
122 43 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 12, 2 (Apr. 12, 1977).
123 See id. at 4-13.
'm Id. at 6 & n.4 (citing statements made by the United States Public Health Service,
the American Medical Association and the Vocational Rehabilitation Administration).
195 Id. at 4-6. In particular, the Attorney General emphasized that Congress knew and
expressly approved of HEW's provision of assistance to substance abusers under the Act's
predecessor, the Vocation Rehabilitation Act. Id.
126 Id. at 12-13. See supra notes 77-80 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
definition of "otherwise qualified."
127 43 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 12, 12-13 (Apr. 12, 1977).
128 42 Fed. Reg. 22,677 (1977) (codified as amended at 45 C.F.R. 84 (1989)).
' 5" Id, at 22,685-86 (codified at 45 C.F.R. 84 app. A).
'" 451 F. Supp. 791, 795-97 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
" 1 Id. at 794.
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drugs at the time they filed their job applications with the city.'"
The plaintiffs claimed that the city's policy of excluding job appli-
cants solely on the basis of past drug use violated section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act.'"
The district court began its analysis by considering whether the
Act protects former drug users.'" Turning first to the Act's defi-
nition of "individual with handicaps," the court concluded that drug
addiCtion substantially impairs an individual's ability to engage in
major life activities and thus was a disability.'" Next, the court noted
that the HEW regulations define "individual with handicaps" to
include individuals who "have a record of such impairment."'" The
court concluded, therefore, that under the language of the Act, the
term "individual with handicaps" encompassed former drug
users.'"
The court then considered whether, for policy reasons, it might
interpret the definition of "individual with handicaps" to exclude
drug users. 138 The court ruled, however, that HEW's explanation
of its regulations, which expressly included substance abusers in the
definition of "individual with handicaps," foreclosed any argument
that the Act did not encompass drug users.' 39 When considering
HEW's explanatory statement, the court emphasized the Secretary's
assertions that many legal and medical authorities consider sub-
stance abuse a disease, and that the committees that studied the
Rehabilitation Act knew that HEW had treated substance abusers
as individuals with disabilities for purposes of the Vocational Re-
habilitation Act, the Rehabilitation Act's predecessor.u° The court
held, therefore, that former drug abusers were included in the
Rehabilitation Act's definition of "individual with handicaps. "141
132 Id. One of the plaintiffs was enrolled in a methadone program at the time that he
filed his application.
133 Id. at 793.
134 Id. at 795.
133 Davis, 451 F. Supp. at 795.
133 Id. at 795-96.
137 Id.
139 Id. at 796.
I" Id.
14° Id. See 45 C.F.R. 84 app. A, subpt. A, 14 (1989), for the explanatory statement.
See supra notes 116-29 and accompanying text for a discussion of the history of the explan-
atory statement. The court suggested that absent the statement, it might have considered
arguments that Congress did not intend that the Act protect drug addicts. See Davis, 451 F.
Supp. at 796,
141 Davis, 451 F. Supp. at 796.
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The court accordingly granted the plaintiff's motion for summary
judgment on the ground that the city's policy violated section 504. 142
B. Substance Abusers as Otherwise Qualified Individuals with Disabilities
After Davis, most courts have summarily concluded that the
Rehabilitation Act's definition of "individual with handicap" does
encompass substance abusers. 143 The courts have instead focused
on the second element of the prima facie case, whether the plaintiff
is otherwise qualified for the position.'" As noted above, the Act's
anti-discrimination provisions generally protect only those plaintiffs
who are qualified or otherwise qualified. 145 In his 1977 opinion,
Attorney General Bell specifically noted that the Act's limitation of
its protections to only qualified substance abusers allowed employers
to refuse to hire individuals whose substance abuse prevented them
from successfully performing the job. 146
1. The 1978 Amendment
A few months after the decision in Davis, Congress passed
section 122 of the Rehabilitation, Comprehensive Services, and De-
velopmental Disabilities Amendments of 1978 ("1978 amend-
ment"). 147 The 1978 amendment, a compromise agreement between
142 Id. at 799. The court also held that the city's policy violated the equal protection and
due process clauses of the fourteenth amendment. id. at 801.
1" See, e.g., Rodgers v. Lehman, 869 F.2d 253, 258 (4th Cir. 1989) (alcoholism is handicap
under Rehabilitation Act); Crewe v. United States Office of Personnel Management, 834 F.2d
140, 141 (8th Cir. 1987) ("At the outset there can be little doubt that alcoholism is a handicap
for the purposes of the Act."); Wallace v. Veterans Admin., 683 F. Supp. 758, 761 (D. Kan.
1988) (alcoholism and drug addiction fall within definition of handicap for purposes of
Rehabilitation Act). In theory, a defendant could prevail by rebutting the plaintiff's conten-
tion that substance abuse substantially impaired his or her major life activities. See 43 Op.
Att'y Gem No. 12, 8-9 (Apr. 12, 1977).
' 44 See, e.g., Butler v. Thornburgh, 900 F.2d 871, 875-76 (5th Cir. 1990); Anderson v.
Univ. of Wis., 841 F.2d 737, 740-42 (7th Cir. 1988); Wallace, 683 F. Supp. at 761-66.
145 See supra notes 77-80 and accompanying text.
146 See 43 Op. Att'y Gem No. 12, 11-12.
142 Pub. L. No. 95-602, 122, 92 Stat. 2955, 2984-85 (1978) (codified in part at 29
U.S.C. II 706(8)(B) (1988)). The amendment added the following provision to the Rehabili-
tation Act's definition of "individual with handicaps":
For purposes of sections 503 and 504 as such sections relate to employment,
such term does not include any individual who is an alcoholic or drug abuser
whose current use of alcohol or drugs prevents such individual from performing
the duties of the job in question or whose employment, by reason of such
current alcohol or drug abuse, would constitute a direct threat to property or
the safety of others.
Id. The Rehabilitation, Comprehensive Services, and Developmental Disabilities Amendments
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the House of Representatives and the Senate, was the end result of
a proposal by Representative Erlenborn to exclude from the defi-
nition of "individual with handicaps" all alcoholics and drug abusers
in "need of rehabilitation. "148
The Senate was concerned that the Erlenborn amendment
would exclude not only current, unrehabilitated substance abusers,
but also former substance abusers participating in long-term treat-
ment programs.'" As an alternative, Senators Cannon and Williams
offered an amendment excluding only those substance abusers
whose condition prevented them from performing essential func-
tions of the job.' 5° Senator Cannon indicated that their amendment
was a response to HEW's inclusion of substance abusers in the
Rehabilitation Act's definition of "individual with handicaps," and
the provisions of the Act that require affirmative action. 151 That
combination, according to Senator Cannon, forced employers to
hire substance abusers without regard to the character or sensitivity
of the position's duties.' 52 As an example of the flexibility of the
Senate amendment, Senator Cannon suggested that the Rehabili-
tation Act, if so amended, would protect substance abusers applying
for jobs as baggage handlers, but not substance abusers applying
for jobs as airline pilots. 155
Senators Williams and Hathaway, on the other hand, both
stated that although they supported the Senate amendment, it was
redundant. 154 The senators noted that the purpose of the amend-
ment was to allay the fear of employers that the Rehabilitation Act
required them to employ individuals whose substance abuse im-
paired their job performance.' 55 Both senators pointed out that
had several purposes: to extend the funding for programs established in the Rehabilitation
Act; to establish community service employment programs for individuals with disabilities;
to provide comprehensive services for individuals with disabilities living independently; and
to revise and extend programs established under the Development Disabilities Services and
Facilities Construction Act. 92 Stat. 2955. Section 122 of those Amendments contained several
miscellaneous amendments to the Rehabilitation Act, including the addition to the definition
of "individual with handicaps." Id. 122.
' 45 H.R. REP. No. 1149, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
7312, 7333-34.
' 49 124 Cotqc. REC. 30,323 (1978) (remarks of Sen. Cannon and Sen. Williams).
' 5° Id. (remarks of Sen. Cannon and Sen. Williams).
' 5 ' Id. (remarks of Sen. Cannon).
15!
	 at 30,322 (remarks of Sen. Cannon).
1" Id. at 30,323 (remarks of Sen. Cannon).
1" Id. at 30,323-24 (remarks of Sen. Williams and Sen. Hathaway).
1 " Id. (remarks of Sen. Williams and Sen. Hathaway).
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Congress, in extending the protections of sections 503 and 504 only
to qualified individuals with disabilities, had already addressed those
concerns. The senators contended that, because the Act protected
only qualified individuals, employers and programs could hold sub-
stance abusers to the same standards of performance and behavior
as other employees or program participants, even if the unsatisfac-
tory performance or behavior was related to the substance abuse.' 56
Congress ultimately adopted the compromise amendment pro-
posed by the Conference Committee.'" The Conference Committee
amendment excluded from the Rehabilitation Act's definition of
"individual with handicaps" any alcoholic or drug abuser "whose
current use of alcohol or drugs prevents such individual from per-
forming the duties of the job in question or whose employment, by
reason of such current alcohol or drug abuse, would constitute a
direct threat to the property or the safety of others." 158 The Con-
ference Committee report indicated that the amendment "clarifies
that only those [substance abusers] who cannot perform the essential
functions of a job in question" are excluded from the Act's protec-
tions.' 59 Senator Williams, speaking in support of the adoption of
the Conference Committee report, stated that the compromise
agreement simply clarified the intent of the Congress, as reflected
in the legislative history surrounding the passage of the Act in 1973,
that the Act's anti-discrimination provisions protect only qualified
substance abusers. 16°
I" Id. (citing 43 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 12 (Apr. 12, 1977)); see also Reese John Henderson,
Jr., Note, Addiction as Disability: The Protection of Akoholics and Drug Addicts Under the Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990, 44 VANE). L. REV. 713, 729 (1991) ("The 1978 Amendment
essentially codified the interpretation of the United States Attorney General and the courts
that addicts are individuals with handicaps, but may or may not be otherwise qualified
depending on their degree of impairment.").
157 Pub. L. No. 95-602, § 122, 92 Stat. 2984-85 (1978) (codified in part at 29 U.S.C.
11 706(8)(3)(1988)).
1 " H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1780, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 102 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 7375, 7413; see also 124 CONG. REC. 37,509 (1978). According to the legislative
history, employers may not assume that any individual with a history of alcoholism or drug
abuse poses a threat to the safety of others or property. 124 CONG. REC. 35,710 (1978)
(remarks of Sen. Williams). Only the demonstration that an employee's substance abuse poses
a "direct threat" to the safety of individuals or property is sufficient to exclude the employee
from the definition of "individual with handicaps." Id.
'n H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1780, 95th Cong. 2d Sess. 102 (1978), reprinted in 1978
,U.S.C.C.A.N. 7375, 7413.
'w 124 CONG. REC. 37,509-10 (1978) (remarks of Sen. Williams). Senator Williams
remarked:
Again, the amendment in this regard simply makes explicit what prior inter-
preters of the act—including those of the Attorney General and the Secretary
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2. Cases Applying the 1978 Amendment
In determining whether the Rehabilitation Act's anti-discrimi-
nation provisions protect a particular substance abuser, some courts
have turned to the 1978 amendment.' 61
 These courts have inter-
preted the amendment as imposing a unique standard that sub-
stance abusers must meet in order to receive protection under the
Act.' 62
 Other courts have instead treated substance abuse like other
disabilities and simply focused on whether the substance abuser is
otherwise qualified.' 63
 These courts have emphasized whether,
of Health, Education, and Welfare—have found: Where addiction or alcoholism
prevents a person from successfully performing the job, the person need not
be provided the employment opportunity in question.
Id. at 37,510 (remarks of Sen. Williams).
In 1988, Congress, during debate on an amendment concerning the exclusion of indi-
viduals with contagious diseases ("1988 amendment") from the Rehabilitation Act's definition
of "individual with handicaps," again discussed the intent of the 1978 amendment. 134 CONG.
REC. S1739-40 (daily ed. Mar. 2, 1988) (remarks of Sen. Harkin). The 1988 amendment,
employing language very similar to that of the 1978 amendment, excludes from the Act's
definition of "individual with handicaps," individuals with currently contagious diseases who,
because of the disease, pose a direct threat to the health or safety of others or are unable to
perform the duties of the job. Compare Pub. L. No. 100-259, 11 9, 102 Stat. 31 (1988) (codified
at 29 U.S.C. 11 706(8)(C) (1988)) (1988 amendment) with 29 U.S.C. 706(8)(B) (1988) (1978
amendment). Senator Harkin, a cosponsor of the 1988 amendment, stated that the amend-
ment was intended to codify the Supreme Court's requirement, articulated in School Board v.
Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 287-88 (1987), that courts consider the degree of risk and the availability
of accommodations that would reduce the risk in determining whether individuals with
contagious diseases are otherwise qualified. 134 Conro. REC. 51 739 (daily ed. Mar. 2, 1988)
(statement of Sen. Harkin); see also Stephen L. Mikochik, Handicaps Which Threaten Others and
the Prohibition of Discrimination Under the Rehabilitation Act, 6 HOFSTRA L REV. 199, 215-16
(1989). Senator Harkin noted that the 1988 amendment, like the 1978 amendment, was
designed to clarify, rather than modify, the standards of section 504. 134 Cosio. REC. 51739
(daily ed. Mar. 2, 1988) (statement of Sen. Harkin). Reviewing the history of the 1978
amendment, Senator Harkin emphasized that the 1978 amendment did not change the
application of the standards of section 504 to substance abusers. Id. at S1739-40. But cf. Hart
v. United States, 585 F.2d 1025, 1032 (Cl. Ct. 1978) ("The courts have consistently stated
that expression of opinion by a subsequent Congress on the meaning of an Act adopted by
an earlier Congress has little, if any, significance.").
I" See, e.g:, Heron v. McGuire, 803 F.2d 67, 68-69 (2d Cir. 1986); Burka v. New York
City Transit Auth., 680 F. Supp. 590, 596-600 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
162 See, e.g., Heron, 803 F.2d at 68-69; Burka, 680 F. Supp. at 596-600. But cf. Henderson,
supra note 156, at 729-30 n.130 (arguing that Burka and Heron courts' interpretation of 1978
amendment is incorrect, because 1978 amendment simply clarifies definition of qualified
under section 504).
166 See, e.g., Copeland v. Philadelphia Police Dep't, 840 F.2d 1139, 1148-49 (3d Cir.
1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1004 (1989); Wallace v. Veterans Admin., 683 F. Supp. 758, 761-
67 (D. Kan. 1988). See supra , notes 77-80 and accompanying text for a discussion of
"otherwise qualified."
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given a reasonable accommodation, the substance abuser can per-
form the essential functions of the job.' 64
In 1986, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit applied the former approach in Heron v. McGuire and held
that the dismissal of a police officer who tested positive for heroin
was not a violation of section 504. 165 In its analysis of the plaintiff's
section 504 claim, the Heron court turned to the language of the
1978 amendment. The court reasoned that because the plaintiff's
drug dependence required him to violate laws that he had sworn
to uphold, his drug use interfered with his ability to perform his
job duties. 166 The court therefore held that, because the 1978
amendment excluded individuals whose substance abuse impaired
their performance, the plaintiff was not protected by section 504. 187
In 1988, the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York, relying on the legislative history of the 1978
amendment, held in Burka v. New York City Transit Authority that
sections 503 and 504 of the Rehabilitation Act protect only reha-
bilitated or rehabilitating drug abusers. 168 The Burka plaintiffs were
employees of the Transit Authnrity who either had been or could
have been discharged based on their positive drug test results.'69
They challenged the legality of several Transit Authority rules man-
dating drug testing."° The plaintiffs in Burka argued that the testing
164 See Copeland, 840 F.2d at 1149; Wallace, 683 F. Supp. at 766-67.
165 803 F.2d 67, 68-69 (2c1 Cir. 1986). Blood was drawn from the plaintiff after he
fainted at work and was taken to the hospital. Id. at 68. Although the blood was taken shortly
after the plaintiff fainted, the blood test was not administered until one week later, when the
police department requested it. Id.
168 Id. at 68-69.
167 Id. at 69. The court accordingly found it unnecessary to consider whether the plaintiff
was otherwise qualified.
168 680 F. Supp. 590, 600 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). Other courts have similarly interpreted the
1978 amendment to impose a requirement of rehabilitation upon substance abusers seeking
protection under the Act. See Teahan v. Metro-North Commuter R.R., No. 88 Civ. 5376,
1991 WL 60388 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 1991) (after 1978 amendment, Rehabilitation Act protects
only alcoholics who are are rehabilitated or rehabilitating); Whitlock v. Donovan, 598 F.
Supp. 126, 129 n.3 (D.D.C. 1984) (plaintiff not protected under section 504 because 1978
amendment bars substance abusers in need of rehabilitation), aff 'd mom. sub nom. Whitlock
v. Brock, 790 F.2d 964 (D.C. Cir. 1986); see also Railway Labor Executives Ass'n v. Burnley,
839 F.2d 575, 591 (9th Cir. 1988) (section 504 protects only substance abusers whose problems
are "under control" because 1978 amendment excluded substance abusers who pose threat
to property or safety), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives'
Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989); LeMere v. Burnley, 683 F. Supp. 275, 276 n.1 (D.D.C. 1988)
(after 1978 amendment, section 504 does not apply to individuals currently using alcohol).
19Y
	 F. Supp. at 594-96.
179
 Id. at 594. The plaintiffs did not challenge rules that required testing when a
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violated the Rehabilitation Act because, under the 1978 amend-
ment, an employer could not dismiss employees or refuse to hire
applicants who were substance abusers unless the substance abuse
impaired their performance or rendered their employment dan-
gerous to property or public safety."'
The court first observed that it would be illogical for Congress
to allocate millions of dollars to the war on drugs and simultaneously
protect users of illegal drugs under the Rehabilitation Act.'" To
support its opinion,, the court focused on the legislative history of
the 1978 amendment.'" The court emphasized that the Senate's
rejection of Representative Erlenborn's amendment, which would
have excluded all substance abusers in need of rehabilitation from
the definition of "individual with handicaps," was rooted not in the
desire to protect substance abusers, but in the fear that the lack of
any provision for employees currently undergoing rehabilitation
would have discouraged employees with substance abuse problems
from seeking or continuing treatment.' 74 The court concluded that
the intent of the 1978 amendment was to protect only rehabilitated
and rehabilitating drug abusers. 175 Because the plaintiffs had not
offered evidence that they were participating in a rehabilitation
program, the court held that they were not protected by the Act.' 76
3. Cases Examining Whether Substance Abusers Are Otherwise
Qualified
Not all courts, however, resolve whether the Rehabilitation Act
protects a particular substance abuser based upon the language or
legislative history of the 1978 amendment.' 77 Some courts have
instead considered whether the substance abuser is qualified, that
supervisor had reason to believe that an employee's poor performance was due to drug use
or when an employee had previously tested positive for drug use.
"' Id. at 597. The plaintiffs also claimed that the testing violated their rights to due
process and protection against unreasonable search and seizure under both the federal and
state constitutions. Id. at 594-96.
172 Id. at 597.
173 Id. at 598-99. See supra notes 147-60 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
1978 amendment.
"4 Burka, 680 F. Supp. at 600-01.
15 Id. at 600.
16 Id. at 600-01.
m See, e.g., Copeland v. Philadelphia Police Dep't, 840 F.2d 1139, 1149 (3d Cir. 1988),
cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1004 (1989); Wallace v. Veterans Admin., 683 F. Supp. 758, 766-67 (D.
Kan. 1988).
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is, whether, given a reasonable accommodation, the individual is
able to perform the essential functions of the job.'"
In the 1988 case of Wallace v. Veterans Administration, the United
States District Court for the District of Kansas held that the Veterans
Administration's ("VA") refusal to hire a rehabilitating drug abuser
as a nurse in an intensive care unit ("ICU") was discriminatory
under section 504 of the Act because the VA could have accom-
modated the plaintiff's disability through job sharing or patient
assignment.' 79 The plaintiff in Wallace was an experienced ICU
nurse who, at the time of her application to the VA, had not used
drugs for over nine months."° In a letter of recommendation sub-
mitted to the VA, her physician advised the VA to restrict the
plaintiff's access to injectable narcotics for the first twelve to eigh-
teen months of her employment.' 8 ' The VA refused to hire the
plaintiff on the ground that her restricted access to narcotics im-
paired her ability to perform the duties of an ICU nurse.'"
The Wallace court held that the plaintiff was protected by the
Rehabilitation Act because she could have performed the essential
functions of the job if the VA had made a reasonable accommo-
dation to her disability.'" The Wallace court first stated that alco-
holics and drug abusers are included in the section 504 definition
of "individual with handicaps."'" The court also declared that the
possibility of reasonable accommodation must be considered when
determining whether a particular substance abuser is otherwise
qualified and thus protected under section 504. 185 The court then
analyzed whether the VA had shown the absence of any reasonable
accommodation that would have allowed the plaintiff to perform
the essential functions of an ICU nurse without administering nar-
cotics to patients.' 86 Based on evidence that ICU nurses spend less
than two percent of their time administering narcotics to patients
and that many patients in ICU's do not receive narcotics, the court
held that the VA could have accommodated the plaintiff's disability
178 See, e.g., Copeland, 840 F.2d at 1148-49; Wallace, 683 F. Supp. at 764-67.
179 683 F. Supp, 758,766-67 (D. Kan. 1988).
"K' Id. at 759.
181 Id. at 759-60.
182 Id. at 760.
185
 Id. at 766-67.
1g4 Id. at 761.
188 Id. at 761-63.
188 Id. at 765-67. The Wallace court adopted the approach of the Fifth Circuit in Prewitt
v. United States Postal Service, 662 F.2d 292 (5th Cir. Unit A Nov. 1981), in allocating the
burden of proof. Wallace, 683 F. Stipp. at 764.
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by assigning her to patients who did not require narcotics or allow-
ing her to trade off the duty of administering narcotics with other
ICU nurses.' 87 Thus, the court held that the plaintiff was otherwise
qualified and entitled to protection under the Rehabilitation Act.' 88
In 1988, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit similarly focused on whether the plaintiff was otherwise
qualified in holding in Copeland v. Philadelphia Police Department that
a police officer who tested positive for the presence of marijuana
was not protected by the Rehabilitation Ac0 89 The plaintiff argued
that his dismissal was a violation of the Act because the department
did not accommodate him by providing him the opportunity to
undergo rehabilitation.' 9°
The court held that the plaintiff was not protected by the Act
because he was not otherwise qualified for the position.' 91 In reach-
ing its holding, the court emphasized the difficulty that a police
department would face if forced to retain officers who violate the
laws that they are hired to uphold. 192 The court held that such an
accommodation would be unreasonable, because it would necessar-
ily require a substantial modification of the essential nature of a
police department.' In light of the absence of any accommodation
that would have allowed the plaintiff to work as a police officer, but
would not have placed unreasonable demands on the department,
the court held that the plaintiff was not otherwise qualified.' 93 His
dismissal, therefore, did not violate the Act.'"
In Guerriero v. Schultz, the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia held, in 1983, that the dismissal of a Foreign
Service Officer did not violate the Rehabilitation Act because the
plaintiff's misconduct, not his alcoholism, was the basis for his dis-
1 " Id. at 765-67.
t"" Id. at 767.
169 840 F.2d 1139, 1149 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1004 (1989). The plaintiff
in Copeland was tested for drug use after his former girlfriend, a fellow police officer, alleged
that she had seen him use illegal drugs. Id. at 1142.
190 Id. at 1148-49. The plaintiff also raised claims of unreasonable search and seizure,
lack of due process, denial of equal protection and invasion of his liberty interest in his
reputation. Id. at 1143-48.
191 Id. at 1148-49.
192 Id. at 1149. See also Nisperos v. Buck, 720 F. Supp. 1424, 1427-29 (N.D. Cal. 1989)
(dismissal of INS attorney after he completed rehabilitation violated Rehabilitation Act be-
cause addiction did not affect work performance and because absence of history of drug use
was not essential requirement for job).
103 Copeland, 840 F.2d at 1149.
Iwo Id.
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missal.'" The court also noted, however, that the plaintiff's need
for therapy that was available only in the United States was incom-
patible with the Foreign Service requirement for overseas service. 196
Because the agency could have accommodated the plaintiff only by
waiving an "essential condition of employment in the Foreign Ser-
vice," the overseas duty requirement, the court concluded that he
was not otherwise qualified under the Rehabilitation Act. 197
In sum, cases addressing the question of whether section 504
of the Rehabilitation Act protects a particular substance abuser
demonstrate two approaches.'" Some courts focus on the 1978
amendment to the Act that excludes substance abusers whose dis-
ability impairs their performance from the definition of "individual
with handicaps."99 These courts interpret the language of the
amendment, then apply their interpretation to the facts of the
case.20° For other courts, the determination of whether a substance
abuser is entitled to protection under the Act turns solely on
whether the individual is, according to the Act's definition, quali-
fied."' These courts look to whether, given a reasonable accom-
I " 557 F. Supp. 511, 513 (D.D.C. 1983). The Foreign Service dismissed the plaintiff for
an off-duty incident in a Uruguay bar that involved sex acts between the plaintiff and three
or four local prostitutes in the presence of at least one spectator. Id. at 512 n.2. In reaching
its decision to dismiss the plaintiff, the Board of Foreign Service expressly proceeded on the
assumption that he was not an alcoholic. Id. at 513.
Other courts have similarly denied Rehabilitation Act claims on the grounds that the
challenged action was provoked by the plaintiff's conduct, rather than his or her substance
abuse. See, e.g., Anderson v. University of Wis., 841 F.2d 737, 741-42 (7th Cir. 1988) (law
school's refusal to readmit student who claimed past poor performance was due to alcoholism
was not violation of section 504 because law school's decision was based on its assessment of
plaintiff's ability to handle the work, not his alcoholism); Butler v. Meese, Civ. A. No. 88-
2924, 1989 WL 38723 (E.D. La. Apr. 19, 1989) (FBI's dismissal of employee after four
incidents of misconduct was not violation of section 501 because discharge was for miscon-
duct, not alcoholism); Richardson v. United States Postal Serv., 613 F. Supp. 1213, 1215-16
(D.D.C. 1985) (discharge of postal employee after he pled guilty to assault charge was not
violation of sections 501 or 504 because criminal conduct was not entirely a manifestation of
alcoholism). For a criticism of this approach, see David A. Larson, Mental Impairments and the
Rehabilitation Act, 48 LA. L. REV. 841, 856-59, 870-72 (1988).
Guerriero, 557 F. Supp. at 514.
197 See id.
196 Compare Heron v. McGuire, 803 F.2d 67, 68-69 (2d Cir. 1986) and Burka v. New
York City Transit Auth., 680 F. Supp. 590, 596-601 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) with Copeland v.
Philadelphia Police Dept, 840 F.2d 1139, 1148-49 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1004
(1989) and Wallace v. Veterans Admin., 683 F. Supp. 758, 762-64 (D. Kan. 1988).
199 See, e.g., Heron, 803 F.2d at 68-69; Burka, 680 F. Supp. at 596-600.
2® See, e.g., Heron, 803 F.2d at 68-69; Burka, 680 F. Supp. at 596-601.
"' See, e,g., Copeland, 840 F.2d at 1148-49; Wallace, 683 F. Supp. at 764-67.
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modation, the substance abuser can perform the essential functions
of the job. 202
C. Reasonable Accommodation for Substance Abusers
The third element of a prima facie case under the Rehabilita-
tion Act is a showing that a reasonable accommodation is possible. 205
Several cases brought under section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act,
which prohibits discrimination by federal agencies, have discussed
the nature of the reasonable accommodation that agencies must
make. for employees with substance abuse problems. 2" In Whitlock
v. Donovan, for example, the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia held, in 1984, that section 501 requires federal
agencies to provide employees with a firm choice between obtaining
treatment or disciplinary action before dismissing an employee for
performance problems related to substance abuse. 2°5 The court also
held that a federal agency could not automatically dismiss an em-
ployee who relapsed after obtaining treatment for substance
abuse.206 Instead, the court required that the agency first offer the
employee any alternatives ,to dismissal that would not unduly bur-
den the agency, such as an unpaid leave of absence to obtain further
treatment. 207
505 See, e.g., Copeland, 840 F.2d at 1149; Wallace, 683 F. Supp. at 766-67.
405
 See supra note 103 and accompanying text for a discussion of the allocation of the
burden of proof on the issue of reasonable accommodation. See also Crewe v. United States
Office of Personnel Management, 834 F.2d 140, 143 (8th Cir. 1989); Wallace v. Veterans
Admin., 683 F. Supp. 758, 764 (D. Kan. 1988).
2°4 See, e.g., Rodgers v. Lehman, 869 F.2d 253, 258-59 (4th Cir. 1989); Walker v.
Weinberger, 600 F. Supp. 757, 761-62 (D.D.C. 1985); Whitlock v. Donovan, 598 F. Supp.
126, 130-34 (D.D.C. 1984), aff 'd mem. sub num. Whitlock v. Brock, 790 F.2d 964 (D.C. Cir.
1986). The 1978 amendment excluding substance abusers whose disability impairs their
performance from the definition of "individual with handicaps" does not apply to section
501. Crewe, 834 F.2d at 142 (1978 amendment does not extend to section 501 in light of
plain meaning of amendment and congressional intent to make the federal government a
model employer of people with disabilities). Several courts ruling on section 501 claims have
considered the reasonableness of the accommodation made by employers to employees whose
substance abuse impaired their performance without expressly finding that the employee
met the Act's requirements for protection. See, e.g., McElrath v. Kemp, 714 F. Supp. 23, 27
(D.D.C. 1989); Callicotte v. Carlucci, 698 F. Supp. 944, 949 (D.D.C. 1988); Whitlock, 598 F.
Supp. at 131. But see LeMere v. Burnley, 683 F. Supp. 275, 280 (D.D.C. 1988) (in dicta, court
states that alternative groUnd for decision that dismissal did not violate section 501 was that
plaintiff's absenteeism prevented her from doing her job, and that plaintiff was therefore
not a qualified employee with a disability entitled to protection under section 501).
..115 598 F. Supp. at 134.
2°' Id.
497 See id.
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The plaintiff in Whitlock, a Department of Labor ("DOL") em-
ployee, frequently missed work between 1980 and 1983 due to his
alcoholism. 2" The plaintiff's supervisors responded to his absen-
teeism with various disciplinary actions, including formal repri-
mands, warnings of more serious sanctions and leave restrictions.
The supervisors also actively encouraged the plaintiff to obtain
counseling; they referred him to counseling several times and, in
one instance, escorted him to an initial counseling meeting. Addi-
tionally, the supervisors adjusted the plaintiff's schedule to allow
him to begin and leave work early and offered him reassignment
to a less stressful position. Despite the actions of his supervisors,
the plaintiff continued to miss work, and, in 1983, the agency
discharged him for excessive absenteeism. The plaintiff brought an
action charging that his dismissal violated section 501 of the Reha-
bilitation Act.20"
The court began its analysis of the plaintiff's Rehabilitation Act
claim by noting that Congress, in enacting section 501 and the
Comprehensive Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism Prevention, Treat-
ment, and Rehabilitation Act of 1970 ("Alcohol Rehabilitation Act")
intended that, where employees' alcoholism impaired their job per-
formance, federal employers would make a significant effort to
assist alcoholic employees before dismissing them. 210 The court fur-
ther noted that those affirmative action efforts fell within the con-
cept of reasonable accommodation. 2 " To ascertain the nature of
the required accommodation, the court turned to guidelines issued
by the Office of Personnel Management ("OPM") concerning em-
ployees with substance abuse problems and employees whose dis-
abilities prevent them from performing their job duties. 212
The court reviewed a series of OPM guidelines that requires
supervisors who suspect that alcoholism is the cause of an employ-
ee's poor performance to inform the employee of available coun-
208 See id. at 134-36.
209 Whitlock, 598 F. Supp. at 128-29.
21° Id. at 131. The Alcohol Rehabilitation Act provides that a person may not be denied
federal civilian employment or a federal license solely on the basis of prior alcoholism. 42
U.S.C. 290dd-1(b)(1) (1988). Congress has also prohibited the denial of federal civilian
employment or a federal license on the grounds of prior drug abuse. Id. f 290ee-1(b)(1).
911 Whitlock, 598 F. Supp. at 136. Because section 501 requires federal employers to take
affirmative action toward individuals with disabilities, section 501 may impose a higher level
of accommodation upon federal employers than section 504 imposes upon federal grantees.
Henderson, supra note 156, at 731 n.144.
"2 See Whitlock, 598 F. Supp. at 131-33.
186	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW 	 [Vol. 33:155
seling. 213 If the employee does not obtain counseling and continues
to perform poorly, the guidelines instruct the supervisor to provide
the employee with a firm choice between obtaining treatment or
facing disciplinary action. 214 The court also reviewed guidelines that
direct agencies to consider granting employees an unpaid leave of
absence when a disability that renders an employee unable to per-
form his or her job seems likely to respond to rehabilitation. 2 ' 5
Relying on these guidelines, the court found that DOL's actions did
not constitute a reasonable accommodation. 216 The court faulted
the agency for not requiring the plaintiff, after his earlier attempts
at rehabilitation failed, to enroll in another treatment program or
face disciplinary action. 217 The court also noted that the agency
decided to dismiss the plaintiff without considering the availability
of alternative courses of action, such as an extended leave without
pay, which would have allowed him to obtain intensive inpatient
treatment. 218
In 1985, one year after the Whitlock decision, the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia held in Walker v. Wein-
berger that reasonable accommodation of an employee with a sub-
stance abuse problem requires a federal employer to forgive past
alcohol-induced misconduct in proportion to the employee's will-
ingness to undergo, and his or her success in, treatment. 219 The
plaintiff in Walker, an employee for the Department of Defense's
Printing Service, was disciplined by the agency three times for ab-
sence without leave. 220 He then revealed he was an alcoholic. The
agency allowed him to obtain inpatient treatment, but, upon his
return, initiated disciplinary proceedings for several violations of
213 Id. at 131.
2 " Id. at 131-32.
216 Id. at 132.
216
 Id. at 136.
212 Id.
212 Id. at 137. Several courts have similarly emphasized the employer's consideration of
alternatives to dismissal in determining whether the employer made a reasonable accom-
modation to an employee with a substance abuse problem. See, e.g., McElrath v. Kemp, 714
F. Supp. 23, 27-28 (D.D.C. 1989) (no reasonable accommodation where agency did not
consider possibility of offering employee leave without pay to undergo treatment); Callicotte
v. Carlucci, 698 F. Supp. 944, 949-50 (D.D.C. 1988) (no reasonable accommodation where
agency did not offer plaintiff a second opportunity for treatment when she relapsed); LeMere
v. Burnley, 683 F. Supp. 275, 278 (D.D.C. 1988) (agency did reasonably accommodate
plaintiff's alcoholism where it provided two extended leaves of absence and was willing to
arrange for third leave in lieu of termination).
219 600 F. Supp. 757, 762 (D.D.C. 1985).
229 Id. at 759-60.
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the agency's leave policy. 22 ' Based on the plaintiff's pre- and post-
treatment infractions, the agency discharged him.
Citing Whitlock, the court began its analysis of the plaintiff's
claim of handicap discrimination by asserting that the Alcohol Re-
habilitation Act and section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act require
federal agencies to make reasonable accommodations for alcoholic
federal employees. 222 The court reasoned that allowing an employer
to consider pre-treatment misconduct not only was inconsistent with
Congress's desire to treat alcoholism as a disease, but also would
discourage employees with substance abuse problems from seeking
treatment. 223 Thus, the court held that the agency's consideration
of the plaintiff's pre-treatment violations during the disciplinary
proceedings was a breach of its duty to make a reasonable accom-
modation to the plaintiff's alcoholism. 224 The case was remanded
to the agency for reconsideration of the appropriate penalty, in
light of the court's ruling.225
In Rodgers v. Lehman, a 1989 decision, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that reasonable accommo-
dation of alcoholism requires that employers confront the employee
with the consequences of continued drinking, but that they refrain
from immediately dismissing employees who relapse during treat-
ment. 226 Rodgers, a Navy employee, missed hundreds of hours of
work between 1979 and 1984 due to his alcoholism. 227 The Navy
responded with several disciplinary measures, including leave re-
strictions, formal reprimands and suspensions from work. The
Navy also urged Rodgers to obtain counseling. Rodgers alternately
refused to obtain counseling, dropped out of treatment, or resumed
drinking shortly after completing the treatment program. After the
Navy dismissed Rodgers in 1984, he brought suit, alleging that the
dismissal violated section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act. 228
The Rodgers court first stated that federal agencies have a duty
to make a reasonable accommodation to employees suffering from
"I Id. at 760.
"2 Walker, 600 F. Supp. at 761.
'" Id. at 762.
"4 See id.; cf. Callicotte v. Carlucci, 731 F. Supp. 1119,1121-22 (D.D.C. 1990) (personnel
records of misconduct prior to treatment for alcoholism must be expunged because they
were acquired by flawed procedures where the employer did not provide employee reason-
able accommodation).
2" Walker, 600 F. Supp. at 762.
218 869 F.2d 253,259 (4th Cir. 1989).
227 Id. at 254-56.
228 Id. at 254.
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alcoholism. 229 Next, the court reviewed the OPM guidelines that
direct supervisors who believe that alcoholism is causing an em-
ployee's poor performance to inform the employee of available
counseling, provide the employee a firm choice between counseling
and disciplinary measures, and, if necessary, consider granting the
employee a leave without pay.2so
In response to a request from the federal government for a
clear standard of reasonable accommodation, the court then out-
lined a four-step standard for determining whether an agency has
met its duty to accommodate an employee with a substance abuse
problem."' The procedure requires federal employers to: inform
the employee of available counseling services; provide the employee
a "firm choice" between treatment and discipline; allow the em-
ployee to obtain outpatient treatment and, lastly, allow the employee
to obtain inpatient treatment, unless the employee's absence would
cause the agency undue hardship. 232 The court stated that the pro-
cedure was designed to balance the employee's need to obtain ef-
fective treatment, the employer's interest in maintaining an efficient
work force and the probability that recovery would include re-
lapses. 233 Applying that standard to the facts, the court concluded
that the Navy did not properly accommodate the plaintiff's alco-
holism, because it discharged the plaintiff before providing him an
opportunity to obtain inpatient treatment. 234
22° Id. at 258.
23° Rodgers, 869 F.2d at 258-59.
231 Id. at 259.
232 Id.
2" See id. The court wrote:
On the one hand, the nature of the disease of alcoholism requires that there
be a continuum of treatment and that the alcoholic be permitted some oppor-
tunity for failure in order to come to the acceptance of his disease which is the
critical element of his cure. On the other hand, both effective treatment and
the needs of the workplace require that an alcoholic employee be firmly con-
fronted with the consequences of his drinking. Excessive sensitivity is no more
conducive to a cure than is undue rigor, and in the final analysis "reasonable
accommodation" is the establishment of a process which embodies the proper
balance between the two.
Id. Many experts in the field of substance abuse agree that the threat of discipline by an
employer, including the possibility of termination, is one of the most effective methods for
forcing substance abusers to acknowledge the need for treatment. See McLanahan, Annotated
Chicklist: Employer Programs to Control Drug and Alcohol Abuse, in EMPLOYMENT PROBLEMS IN
THE WORKPLACE 39, 68 (PLI Litig. Course Handbook Series No. 305, 1986); see also BOSTON
GLOBE, Sept, 12, 1991, at Al (employed alcoholics, who face possible loss of job, more
motivated in treatment than alcoholics who have already lost their jobs and social supports).
4" Rodgers, 869 F.2d at 260; see also Fuller v. Frank, 916 F.2d 558, 561-62 (9th Cir.
1990) (court adopting Rodgers test for reasonable accommodation held that United States
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At least one court has held that, to make a prima facie case,
substance abusers must show that accommodations to their disability
might be successful. 235 In the 1987 case of Crewe v. United States
Office of Personnel Management, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit held that a substance abuser who had offered
no evidence that her future efforts at rehabilitation would be more
successful than her several previous failed attempts had not estab-
lished a prima facie case of discrimination. 2" In Crewe, the Office
of Personnel Management rejected the application of the plaintiff
for federal employment based on its determination that her alcohol-
related problems made her unsuitable for employment. 237 The
plaintiff's history of alcoholism and treatment dated back more than
twenty years. No treatment had been successful, and the plaintiff
had generally resisted all rehabilitative efforts.
In considering the plaintiff's claim that OPM's rejection of her
application violated section 501, the court noted that OPM may
reject any applicant in order to promote the efficiency of the Civil
Service. 2" Thus, the court concluded that OPM's reliance on the
plaintiff's history of alcoholism in rejecting her application was
legitimate. 2" Next, acknowledging that federal agencies have a duty
to accommodate applicants who are substance abusers, the court
addressed the issue of reasonable accommodation.
The court stated that the plaintiff bears the initial burden of
making a facial showing that reasonable accommodation is possi-
ble.24° Reviewing the plaintiff's history of unsuccessful efforts at
rehabilitation, the court concluded that any future efforts by the
plaintiff would be similarly unsuccessful. The court compared the
plaintiff to a blind person who applies for a job that requires the
reading of printed materials, but who has in the past consistently
refused to use any accommodations, such as sighted readers, that
would allow him or her to perform the job. 24 The court held that
the plaintiff had failed to show the existence of any accommodation
Postal Service had reasonably accommodated alcoholic employee when it allowed him "an
opportunity to obtain several different levels of treatment").
235 See Crewe v. United States Office of Personnel Management, 834 F.2d 140, 143 (8th
Cir. 1987).
235 Id.
232
 Id. at 141.
R39 Id. at 142-43.
239 Id. at 143.
240 Crewe, 834 F.2d at 143.
Y11 Id. at 143 n.7.
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that would allow her to become an efficient employee and therefore
had not established a prima facie case of discrimination. 242
Thus, following Whitlock and subsequent cases, in order to make
a reasonable accommodation to employees' substance abuse prob-
lems, federal employers must initially inform the employee of avail-
able treatment. if the employee obtains treatment, the employer
cannot consider pre-treatment offenses when disciplining the em-
ployee. If the employee refuses to undergo treatment or resumes
drinking or using drugs after treatment, the employer must provide
the employee a firm choice between obtaining treatment and facing
disciplinary measures. Finally, before dismissing the employee, the
employer must offer alternatives to dismissal, such as a leave without
pay to obtain inpatient treatment, if the alternatives do not impose
undue hardship on the employer. At least one court has held that
the employee has the burden of showing that a possibility exists that
the accommodation would be successful.
D. Undue Hardship
If a plaintiff shows that a reasonable accommodation exists, the
burden shifts to the employer to show that the accommodation
would impose undue hardship on the employer. 243 Two recent Dis-
trict of Columbia District Court cases, brought under section 501,
have addressed the issue of undue hardship in the context of sub-
stance abuse.244 In 1988, the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia held in LeMere v. Burnley that an accommoda-
tion requiring an employer to reinstate an alcoholic employee with
a history of erratic conduct would impose undue hardship on the
employer. 245 The plaintiff in LeMere was a Federal Aviation Admin-
istration ("FAA") employee who had been unable to stop drinking
despite twice taking leaves of absence to obtain treatment. 246 During
the periods when the plaintiff was drinking, she was frequently
absent from work. While at work, she was often intoxicated and
occasidnally experienced seizures related to alcohol withdrawal.
242 Id. at 143.
"3 See, e.g., Prewitt v. United States Postal Serv., 662 F.2d 292, 310 (5th Cir. Unit A
Nov. 1981); Whitlock v. Donovan, 598 F. Supp. 126, 137 (D.D.C. 1984), aff'd mem. sub nom.
Whitlock v. Brock, 790 F.2d 964 (D.C. Cir. 1986). See supra notes 85-100 and accompanying
text for a discUssion of the general standards of undue hardship under the Act.
444 See McElrath v. Kemp, 714 F. Supp. 23, 27-28 (D.D.C. 1989); LeMere v. Burnley,
683 F. Supp. 275, 279 & n.9 (D.D.C. 1988).
244 683 F. Supp. 275, 279 & n.9 (D.D.C. 1988).
440 Id. at 276-77.
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After deciding to dismiss the plaintiff, the FAA agreed to stay
her dismissal and grant her a third leave to obtain treatment if she
provided the agency documentation of her intended treatment and
follow-up program. 247 When the plaintiff failed to meet the deadline
for submitting the documentation, the agency dismissed her. The
agency refused to rescind the dismissal even though the plaintiff
entered an inpatient program just two days after the deadline. 248
In analyzing the plaintiff's claim that her dismissal violated
section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act, the court first stated that the
FAA had met its duty to accommodate the plaintiff's alcoholism. 249
The court noted that the FAA had provided the plaintiff several
firm choices between treatment and discipline. 25° The court further
noted that by staying the plaintiff's dismissal and providing her
another leave, to obtain treatment, the agency had met its duty to
consider the availability of alternatives to dismissal that would not
impose undue hardship on the agency. 25 '
The court then addressed the plaintiff's argument that the
FAA was required to accommodate the plaintiff by rescinding her
dismissal after she entered a treatment program. 252 The plaintiff
contended that because the FAA had agreed earlier to grant her a
leave, it must not have felt that her absence would impose undue
hardship on the agency. 253 The court explained that the plaintiff's
irregular conduct, rather than her absence from work, constituted
undue hardship for the FAA. 254 The plaintiff's failure to supply
the requested documentation by the deadline was, according to the
court, an example of her irregular conduct. 255 Requiring the FAA
to reinstate the plaintiff after her failure to meet the deadline
would, therefore, have imposed undue hardship on the agency. 256
242 Id. at 277.
245 Id. at 277-78.
245 Id. at 278-79.
25° Id. at 279.
251 See id.
252 Id.
255 Id. at 279 n.9.
254 Id. at 279 & n.9.
255 See id. at 279.
256 Id. at 279 n.9. According to the Court: "Mt was plaintiff's irregular conduct more
than her absence from the worksite that was the undue hardship for the FAA. Therefore,
plaintiff's reinstatement after her irregular conduct on April 22 [when she failed to meet
the deadline] would amount to an undue hardship for the agency." Id. But see Ferguson v.
United States Dep't of Commerce, 680 F. Supp. 1514, 1518 (M.D. Fla. 1988) (no undue
hardship due to plaintiff's erratic work performance because agency had brought hardship
on itself by tolerating plaintiff's chronic absenteeism for too long).
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In 1989, the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia held, in McElrath v. Kemp, that a leave of absence does
not impose undue hardship on the employer where the employee's
position is not critical to the employer. 257 The plaintiff in McElrath,
an employee in the Department of Housing and Urban Develop-
ment's ("HUD") Office of Finance and Accounting, was a recovering
alcoholic. 258 HUD had previously granted the plaintiff two leaves
to undergo treatment. Within a year of her second rehabilitation,
the plaintiff suffered a relapse and frequently missed work or came
to work intoxicated.259 One year after her relapse, HUD dismissed
the plaintiff, who subsequently filed a claim under section 501 of
the Rehabilitation Act.
The court declared that HUD, as a federal agency, had a duty
to accommodate the plaintiff by determining whether actions, other
than dismissal, were available that would not have imposed undue
hardship on the agency. 260 Examining the possibility that HUD
could have granted the plaintiff a leave without pay, the court noted
that her position was being phased out and that, after her discharge,
a temporary employee had performed the plaintiff's duties. 26 ' The
court concluded that the leave would not have imposed undue
hardship on the agency. 262 Therefore, the court held that HUD had
failed to make a reasonable accommodation to the plaintiff's alco-
holism.265
. In conclusion, substance abusers alleging that an employer has
violated the Rehabilitation Act must first show that they are qualified
for the job.264 Some courts simply require that substance abusers
show the ability to do the job once the employer makes a reasonable
accommodation. 265 Other courts alternatively require that substance
abusers meet the standard set forth in the 1978 amendment, al-
though the courts vary in their interpretations of the amendment. 266
231 714 F. Supp. 23,28 (D.D.C. 1989).
266 Id. at 24.
269-1d. at 25.
260 Id. at 27.
261
 Id, at 27-28.
262 Id. at 28; see also Fisher v. Walters, No. 85—C-1201, 1988 WL 6946 (N.D. III. Jan. 26,
1988) (accommodation of plaintiff's frequent absences caused undue hardship where em-
ployer had already given employee leaves to obtain treatment for alcoholism and other
employees had to make up for plaintiff's absences).
266 McElrath, 714 F. Supp. at 28.
264 See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
266 See supra notes 177-97 and accompanying text.
266 See supra notes 165-76 and accompanying text.
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As part of their prima facie case, substance abusers must also
show a plausible reason to believe that a reasonable accommodation
for their disability exists. 267 In a series of cases brought under
section 501 of the Act, courts have held that a reasonable accom-
modation for substance abusers encompasses a referral to counsel-
ing, leave to obtain treatment and some tolerance of relapses. 268
Once substance abusers show that reasonable accommodation to
their disability is possible, the burden shifts to employers to dem-
onstrate that the accommodation would impose undue hardship
upon them. 269 In determining where accommodation of a substance
abuser would impose undue hardship on a federal employer, the
courts have considered whether the substance abuser's position is
essential to the agency and whether a substance abuser's inconsistent
behavior at work unduly burdens the employer. 270
IV. THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT OF 1990
As noted above, the Rehabilitation Act's provisions prohibiting
discrimination by federal contractors and federal grantees apply to
more than half of the private employers in the United States. 271
Individuals with disabilities subject to discrimination by those pri-
vate employers not covered by the Act, however, formerly had
recourse only through state law. 272 Although all fifty states have
passed some sort of legislation designed to protect individuals with
disabilities, the protection provided by those statutes varies. 2" Some
2°7 See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
268 See supra notes 204-34 and accompanying text.
mg See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
27° See supra notes 244-63 and accompanying text.
271 See supra note 57.
272 See Maureen O'Connor, Note, Defining "Handicap" for Purposes of Employment Discrim-
ination, 30 ARIZ. L. Ray. 633, 649 (1988). The Supreme Court has indicated in dicta that
individuals with disabilities are nit a suspect class entitled to heightened scrutiny under the
equal protection clause of the Constitution. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973);
see also Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 445-46 (1984) (heightened
scrutiny not extended to mentally retarded individuals in part because Court reluctant to
open the door to other groups, including "the aging, the disabled, the mentally ill, and the
infirm"). See generally Marcia Pearce Burgdorf & Robert Burgdorf, Jr., A History of Unequal
Treatment: The Qualifications of Handicapped Persons as a" Suspect Class" Under the Equal Protection
Clause, 15 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 855, 902-08 (1975). Some federal courts have found that
state action that discriminates against individuals with disabilities violates the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution, but this remedy does not apply to
private employers. See Amy Jo Littler, Fair Employment and the Handicapped: A Legal Perspective,
27 DEPAUI. L. REV. 953, 954 n.5 (1978).
272 See O'Connor, supra note 272, at 651. Since the survey contained in O'Connor's
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statutes, for example, do not prohibit discrimination, but simply
assert that the state policy is to encourage the full and equal partic-
ipation of individuals with disabilities in social and economic
areas. 274
State laws also vary in their approach to defining individuals
with disabilities. 275 As of 1988, twenty-four states had adopted def-
initions identical or substantially similar to the Rehabilitation Act
definition.276 Other states, though, define disability by reference to
the degree of employability, by listing conditions that qualify as
disabilities, or by deferring to professional medical judgment.277 In
1990, Congress moved to fill in the gaps left by the Rehabilitation
Act and state law by passing the Americans with Disabilities Act
("ADA").278 The ADA, which bans discrimination in several areas,
article, Delaware has enacted a law prohibiting discrimination on the basis of disability. See
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, * 724 (Supp. 1988).
174 See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:1951 (West 1982); NEa. REV. STAT. § 20-126
(1987).
2" See O'Connor, supra note 272, at 651-55.
276 Id. at 649 n.94. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.01(13) (West Supp. 1991); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § I68A-3(4) (1990). Some of the states that modeled their definitions upon the
Rehabilitation Act definition deleted the provisions concerning individuals who have a record
of a disability or are regarded as having a disability. O'Connor, supra note 272, at 652.
"' Id. at 653-54. Arizona and Wisconsin are examples of states that define individuals
with disabilities by reference to their employability. See Attu. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1461(4)
(1985) (a "handicap" is a physical impairment that substantially restricts an individual's
general ability to obtain, retain or advance in employment); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 111.32(8)(a)
(West 1988) ("handicapped individual" is an individual who has a physical or mental impair-
ment that makes achievement unusually difficult or limits the ability to work). The definitions
of both Maryland and Montana primarily list conditions that qualify as disabilities. See MD.
ANN. CODE art. 498, 115(g) (1986) ("physical impairment" is any physical disability, disfig-
urement, infirmity or malformation caused by bodily injury, birth defect or illness, including,
but not limited to, any degree of paralysis, amputation, lack of physical coordination, and
speech, hearing or vision impairment); MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-101(16) (1989) (definition
of "physical handicap" same as Maryland's). The statutes of Kentucky and South Carolina
provide examples of legislative provisions that rely on medical expertise. See KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 207.130 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1982) (a "physical handicap" is a physical condition
that constitutes a substantial disability and is demonstrable by medically accepted clinical or
laboratory diagnostic techniques); S.C. CODE ANN. § 43-33-560 (Law. Co-op. 1985) (a "hand-
icap" is a substantial physical or mental impairment that is verified by medical findings and
that appears reasonably certain to continue throughout the individual's lifetime). See O'Con-
nor, supra note 272, at 659-71 for a review of the definitions used by the states as of 1988.
222 See H.R. REP. No. 485(11), 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 47-48 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 329-30 ("State laws are inadequate to address the pervasive problems of
discrimination that people with disabilities are facing . . . Current federal law is also
inadequate."); H.R. REP. No. 485(111), 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 448-49 ("The [ADA] completes the circle begun in 1973 with respect to
persons with disabilities . . ."). The ADA supplements, rather than preempts, the antidis-
crimination provisions of the Rehabilitation Act. See Pub. L. No. 101-336, tit. V, 501(b),
104 Stat..369 (1990). See generally Kathleen D. Henry, Note, Civil Rights and the Disabled: A
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including public transportation, public accommodations and ser-
vices and telecommunications services, forbids most private em-
ployers from discriminating against employees and applicants with
disabilities. 279
A. The ADA's Prohibition on Employment Discrimination
Title I of the ADA contains the bulk of its provisions concerning
employment discrimination. 28° These provisions, which go into ef-
fect on July 26, 1992, will apply to all private employers with fifteen
or more employees. 281 Under the ADA, employers may not discrim-
inate against otherwise qualified employees or applicants on the
basis of disability. 282 The ADA defines a "qualified individual with
a disability" as "an individual with a disability who, with or without
a reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions
of the employment position that such individual holds or desires." 2"
Disability, in turn, is defined as a physical or mental impairment
that substantially limits one or more of an individual's major life
activities, the record of such an impairment, or the perception of
others that an individual has such an impairment. 284
Comparison of the Rehabilitation Ad of 1973 and the Americans with Disabilities An of 1990 in the
Employment Setting, 54 ALB. L. Ray. 123 (1989).
To the extent that state law may provide a more generous or more rapid remedy, or
that the state definition of individuals with disabilities encompasses individuals not covered
by the ADA, individuals may continue to turn to state law. See O'Connor, supra note 272, at
649 (individuals protected under federal law may elect to pursue state remedies rather than
face the delay involved in exhausting federal administrative remedies). But see EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION, supra note 56, § 26.4.3, at 53 (most courts have held that, because available
administrative remedies are inadequate, exhaustion is not required under section 509 of the
Rehabilitation Act).
"9 Pub. L. No. 101-336, II 1(b), 104 Stat. 327-28 (1990).
250 See id. tit. 1, 104 Stat. 330-37.
"I Id. 14 101(5)(a), 102(a), 108, 104 Stat. 330, 331-32, 337. Until July 26, 1994, title 1
covers only employers with twenty-five or more employees. Id. § 101(5)(a), 104 Stat. 330.
2" Id. 4 IO2(a), 104 Stat. 331. The House Committee on Education and Labor noted
that the ADA's definition of a qualified individual with a disability is comparable to the
Rehabilitation Act's definition of qualified individuals with handicaps. H.R. REP. No. 485(11)
at 55, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 337.
183 Pub. L. No. 101-336, tit. 1, 4 101(8), 104 Stat. 331 (1990). The definition indicates
that courts should consider the employer's judgment when determining which functions of
a job are essential. See id.
284 Id. § 3(2), 104 Stat. 229-30. The Rehabilitation Act similarly defines "individual with
handicaps" as individuals having a physical or mental impairment that substantially impairs
one or more major life activities, having a record of such an impairment, or being regarded
as having such an impairment. 29 U.S.C. 4 706(8)(A) (1988). See supra notes 110-15 and
accompanying. text for a discussion of the Rehabilitation Act definition. The ADA does not
define the terms used in its definition of disability, but the legislative history of the ADA
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The ADA specifically provides that employers may not refuse
to make a reasonable accommodation to the known disability of an
otherwise qualified applicant or employee unless they can show that
the accommodation would impose an undue hardship upon their
business.285 Similarly, employers may not deny jobs or advancements
to otherwise qualified individuals because of the need to make a
reasonable accommodation to a disability of the employee or appli-
cant.286 The ADA does not define reasonable accommodation, but
it includes a list of modifications that the term may encompass. 287
The list includes making buildings wheelchair accessible, modifying
work schedules and purchasing special equipment. 288
The ADA defines undue hardship as "significant difficulty or
expense."289 It further provides that the determination of whether
an accommodation would require significant difficulty or expense
should take into account the nature and cost of the accommodation,
the effect of the accommodation upon the employer, the financial
resources and facilities of the employer, and the size and structure
of the employer's work force. The statute directs the individual
making the determination to consider not only the employer's busi-
ness as a whole, but also the particular facility that will make the
accommodation and the relationship between that facility and the
entire business. 290
In its report on the ADA, the Committee on Education and
Labor noted that Congress was basing the ADA's definition of "un-
due hardship" on the regulations implementing sections 501 and
504 of the Rehabilitation Act. 291 The Committee accordingly sug-
gested that application of the ADA's definition of undue hardship
should be consistent with the application of the Rehabilitation Act's
suggests that impaired ability to perform a particular job will not be considered a substantial
limitation of the major life activity of working. See H.R. REP. No. 485(111), 101st Cong., 2d
Sess. 29 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445,451.
265
	 L. No. 101-336, tit. 1, § 102(a), (b)(5)(A), 104 Stat. 331-32 (1990); see also H.R.
REP. No. 485(11), 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 33 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303,315
("Reasonable accommodation is a key requirement of the Rehabilitation Act and the [Amer-
icans with Disabilities] Act").
286
	 L. No. 101-336, tit. 1, § 102(b)(5)(B), 104 Stat. 332 (1990).
267 Id.	 101(9), 104 Stat. 331.
sae
	 id, The report of the Committee on Education and Labor indicates that a
reasonable accommodation may also include providing additional unpaid leave days. H.R.
REP. No. 485(11) at 63, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 345.
289
	 L. No. 101-336,	 101(10)(A), 104 Stat. 331.
ft° Id.
"' H.R. REP. No. 485(11) at 67, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 349.
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regulations. 292 In its report on the ADA, the Committee on the
Judiciary indicated that the ADA standard of "significant difficulty
or expense" is greater than both a de minimis standard and the
readily achievable standard of title III of the ADA, which addresses
discrimination in privately-owned public accommodations. 29  The
Committee on the Judiciary also' noted that it had considered, but
rejected, an amendment fixing undue hardship at any cost greater
than ten percent of the employee's salary. 294 The Committee con-
cluded that the flexible approach used under the Rehabilitation Act
to determine undue hardship, rather than a set limit, was more
_appropriate under the ADA. 295
B. Protection of Substance Abusers from Employment Discrimination
under the ADA
Under the ADA, substance abusers bringing an employment
discrimination claim must first show that they are otherwise quali-
fied individuals with disabilities. 296 The reports of the House Com-
mittee on Education and Labor and the House Committee on the
Judiciary agree that the ADA's definition of "disability" encompasses
alcoholism and drug abuse. 297 Section 104 of the ADA, however,
292 Id.
295 H.R. REP. No. 485(111), 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 40 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 463. Section 301(9) of the ADA defines "readily achievable" as easily
accomplishable and able to be carried out without much difficulty or expense. Pub. L. No.
101-336, 4 301(9)(A), 104 Stat. 354 (1990). The list of factors to be considered in determining
whether the removal of architectural, communication and transportation barriers is readily
achievable is the same as the list of factors to be considered in determining whether the
provision of an accommodation would impose undue hardship on an employer. See id.
301(9)(B), 104 Stat. 354-55. See supra notes 87-94 and accompanying text for a discussion
of the de minimis standard.
2W H.R. REP. No. 485(111) at 41, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 464.
295 See id. As an example of this flexible approach, the Committee cited the 1983 decision
of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in Nelson v.
Thornburgh, 567 F. Supp. 369 (E.D. Pa. 1983), aff 'd, 732 F.2d 146 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 1188 (1985). Id. In Nelson, the court held that because the total cost of providing
accommodations for blind welfare workers, including sighted readers and braille forms, was
a small percentage of the agency's personnel budget, the accommodation would not impose
undue hardship on the agency. Id. at 380. The Committee stated that providing the same
accommodations might impose undue hardship on a smaller employer, because the cost
would be a larger percentage of the employer's resources. H.R. REP. No. 485(111) at 41,
reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 464.
296 See Pub. L. No. 101-336, tit. 1, § 102(a), 104 Stat. 331 (1990).
297 See H.R. REP. No. 485(11), 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 51 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 333; H.R. REP. No. 485(111) at 28, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 451.
The ADA expressly excludes certain conditions, including transvestism, homosexuality and
compulsive gambling, from the definition of disability. Pub. L. No. 101-336, tit. V, § 511,
104 Stat. 376 (1990).
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states: "For purposes of (Title I], the term 'qualified individual with
disability' shall not include any employee or applicant who is cur-
rently engaging in the illegal use of drugs, when the covered entity
acts on the basis of such use."298 Although section 104(a) expressly
refers only to users of illegal drugs, the legislative history suggests
that at least some members of Congress intended the provision to
apply to alcoholics as well as users of illegal drugs. 2"
The ADA limits its coverage of users of illegal drugs to indi-
viduals who are no longer engaging in the illegal use of drugs and
who have completed rehabilitation programs or are participating in
rehabilitation programs. 3" In section 512(a) of the ADA, Congress
amended the Rehabilitation Act's definition of "individual with
handicaps" to exclude individuals currently engaging in the illegal
use of drugs."' Paralleling the central ADA provision, the amend-
ment provides that it does not encompass individuals who have
been rehabilitated or are undergoing rehabilitation and who are no
longer engaged in the illegal use of drugs. 302
During the debate on the Conference Committee's report on
the ADA, members of both the House and Senate expressed dismay
over the ADA's treatment of users of illegal drugs. 803 Representative
DeLay, for example, argued that under the provision, an employer
could legitimately dismiss an employee found with illegal drugs at
work, only to have to rehire the employee once he or she enrolled
in a rehabilitation program. 504 Representative Bartlett responded to
Representative DeLay by noting that the Conference Committee's
report provides that "currently engaging in the illegal use of drugs"
" Pub. L. No. 101-336, tit. 1, 11 109(a), 109 Stat. 334 (1990). The ADA defines "illegal
use of drugs" as the use of drugs that, under the Federal Controlled Substances Act, 21
U.S.C. § 812 (1988), it is illegal to possess or distribute. Id. § 101(6)(A), 104 Stat. 330.
"9 See 135 CONG. REC. S10,753 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1989) (colloquy between Sen. Arm-
strong and Sen. Harkin); id. at S10,777 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 1989) (colloquy between Sen. Coats
and Sen. Harkin). Several of section 104's other provisions expressly apply to both users of
illegal drugs and alcoholics. See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 101-336, tit. I, 104(c)—(e), 104 Stat. 334-
36 (1990).
3°° Pub. L. No. 101-336, tit. 1; 104(b), 104 Stat. 335 (1990).
mi Id. § 512(a)(C)(i), 109 Stat. 376 (to be codified as 29 U.S.C. I 706(8)(C)). The
Committee on Education and Labor stated that the amendment does change the treatment
under the Rehabilitation Act of individuals who currently use illegal drugs, but does not
change the Act's standard for alcoholics. H.R. REP. No. 485(11), 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 142
(1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 425.
'431 Pub. L. No. 101-336, tit. V, lj 512(a)(C)(ii), 104 Stat. 376-77 (1990).
ft3 See, e.g., 136 CONG. REC. H4618-19 (daily ed. July 12, 1990) (remarks of Rep. DeLay);
136 CONG. Rm. 59694 (daily ed. July 13, 1990) (remarks of Sen. Armstrong).
30, 136 CONG. REC. H4618 (daily ed. July 12, 1990) (remarks of Rep. DeLay).
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is not limited to the use of illegal drugs within days or weeks of
dismissal.'°5 Instead, the report states that the phrase "currently
engaging in the illegal use of drugs" encompasses any use of illegal
drugs recent enough to support a reasonable belief that the indi-
vidual is presently using drugs. 306
The Conference Committee report further explains that, under
the ADA, employers are allowed to seek reassurances that employ-
ees have not used illegal drugs recently. 307 According to the report,
the ADA provision concerning rehabilitation programs seeks to
protect only former drug users who continue to participate in treat-
ment programs. 308 During the floor debate, Senator Armstrong
expressed doubts that a test turning on a "reasonable belief" that
an individual was currently using illegal drugs was sufficiently pre-
cise to serve as a guide for employers. 309 He predicted that the
resolution of which users of illegal drugs were entitled to protection
under the ADA would be left to the courts.
At least one commentator believes that the ADA's "currently
engaging in" standard strikes the correct balance between protect-
ing employers and others from individuals whose substance abuse
impairs their performance or renders them a threat to property
and public safety and encouraging substance abusers to obtain treat-
ment."' According to the commentator, the "currently engaging
in" standard leaves employers free to rid their workforces of "re-
calcitrant addicts."3 " By protecting individuals who have completed
or are receiving treatment and are drug-free, however, the standard
also encourages substance abusers to obtain treatment. 312 The com-
mentator acknowledges that the "currently engaging in" standard
appears to exclude more substance abusers from the ADA than the
1978 amendment excluded from the Rehabilitation Act, because
some current users of drugs may be able to adequately perform
their jobs and not endanger property or public safety. 5 ' The com-
mentator asserts, however, that because courts have interpreted the
Rehabilitation Act to exclude unrehabilitated substance abusers and
303 Id. at H4619-20 (daily ed. July 12, 1990) (remarks of Rep. Bartlett). See H.R. CONF.
REP. No. 596, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 64 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 565,573.
3"° H.R. CONF. REP. No. 596 at 64, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 573.
3117 Id.
' See id.
368 See 136 CONG. Rec. 59694 (daily ed. July 13, 1990) (remarks of Sen. Armstrong).
See Henderson, supra note 156, at 735-36.
3" Id.
" Id. at 736.
313 Id. at 737-38.
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to allow drug testing, the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act will
protect the same individuals. 3 "
The ADA also provides that employers may hold employees
who engage in the illegal use of drugs or who are alcoholics to "the
same qualification standards for employment or job performance
and behavior that such [employer] holds other employees, even if
any unsatisfactory performance or behavior is related to the drug
use or alcoholism of such employee . . . ." 3 ' 6 The committee reports
do not discuss the basis or purpose of this provision. 516 The legis-
lative history of the ADA, however, is replete with assertions that
Congress drew heavily on the Rehabilitation . Act and its imple-
menting regulations during the drafting of the ADA. 3 ' 7 The ADA
also provides that, "[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this Act, noth-
ing in this Act shall be construed to apply a lesser standard than
the standards applied under title V of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973 or regulations issued by Federal agencies pursuant to such
title. "518 The Committee on the Judiciary explained that, under this
provision, where individuals are protected by both the Rehabilita-
tion Act and the ADA, the courts should not interpret the ADA to
provide less protection than the Rehabilitation Act unless the ADA
expressly provides a different standard. 519
V. ANALYSIS OF THE PROTECTION AGAINST EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION AFFORDED SUBSTANCE ABUSERS UNDER THE
REHABILITATION ACT AND THE ADA
Commentators agree that substance abuse costs employers bil-
lions of dollars annually in lost time and reduced productivity. 320
3L4 Id.
3L Pub. L. No. 101-336, # 104(c)(4), 104 Stat. 335 (1990). Section 104(c) also authorizes
employers to prohibit the illegal use of drugs and use of alcohol in the workplace, to require
that employees not be under the influence of alcohol while at work, and to require that
employees comply with the standards of the Drug-Free Workplace Act of 1988, 41 U.S.C.
§ 701-707 (1989).
313 See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 485(11), 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 78 (1990), reprinted in, 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 360-61; H.R. REP. No. 485(111), 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 47 (1990), reprinted
in, 1990 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 445, 470.
3 " The Committee on Education and Labor stated that the ADA incorporates many of
the standards of discrimination set forth in regulations implementing section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act. H.R. REP. No. 485(11) at 23, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 304. The
Committee on the Judiciary similarly noted that the employment discrimination prohibitions
of the ADA borrow much of their "substantive framework" from section 504. H.R. REP. No.
485(111) at 31, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 454.
315 Pub. L. No. 101-336,11 501(a), 104 Stat. 369 (1990).
319 H.R. REP. NO. 485(111) at 69, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 492.
' 2° See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
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Nonetheless, Congress has chosen to protect substance abusers un-
der federal laws that prohibit discrimination in employment based
upon disability. The Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, pro-
hibits federal employers, contractors and grantees from discrimi-
nating against substance abusers on the basis of their disability
unless the substance abuse impairs their performance on the job or
poses a threat to property or public safety."' The ADA will prohibit
employers with fifteen or more employees from discriminating
against substance abusers on the basis of their disability unless the
individual is currently engaging in the illegal use of drugs or the
individual's substance abuse prevents him or her from meeting
standards that apply to all employees. 322
The Rehabilitation Act and the ADA, however, both leave open
the possibility that, in order to invoke their protections, substance
abusers must meet a different, and more stringent, standard than
individuals with other disabilities. Both the Rehabilitation Act and
the ADA protect only qualified individuals with disabilities. 323 Under
both laws, courts generally determine whether a particular individ-
ual with a disability is qualified by assessing whether, once the
employer makes a reasonable accommodation, the person can per-
form the essential requirements of the job. 324
In determining whether the Rehabilitation Act protects a par-
ticular substance abuser, however, some courts have not applied the
analysis used in cases involving individuals with other disabilities.
The Burka v. New York City Transit Authority court, for example, held
that, as amended in 1978, the Rehabilitation Act protects only sub-
stance abusers who have completed or are participating in rehabil-
itation. 323 Notably, the court did not consider whether employers
had any duty to accommodate employees with substance abuse
problems by providing them the opportunity to obtain treatment
for their disability. Instead, the court limited protection under the
Rehabilitation Act to those substance abusers who had, prior to the
challenged employment action, already obtained treatment.
The court in Heron v. McGuire similarly ignored the possibility
of reasonable accommodation in determining whether the Rehabil-
itation Act protected the plaintiff, a police officer who had tested
'2 ' 29 U.S.C. §1) 706(8)(B), 791(b), 793(a), 794(a) (1988).
822 Pub. L. No. 101-336, tit. I, §11 102(a), 104, 104 Stat. 331, 334-35 (1990).
323 See id.	 102(a), 104 Stat, 331; 29 U.S.C. IR 793(a), 794(a); 29 C.F.R. § 1613.703
(1990).
3" See supra notes 76-80 and accompanying text.
325 680 F. Supp. 590, 600 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). See supra notes 168-76 and accompanying
text for a discussion of the Burka decision.
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positive for heroin. The Heron court concluded that, as amended
in 1978, the Rehabilitation Act's definition of "individual with hand-
icaps" did not include those substance abusers whose disability im-
paired their work performance. 326 Because the court believed that
the plaintiff's drug dependency, which forced him to break the law,
prevented him from properly performing the duties of a police
officer, the court held that the Rehabilitation Act did not protect
the plaintiff. The Heron court did not consider whether a reasonable
accommodation, such as a leave of absence that would have allowed
the plaintiff to obtain treatment, might have cured the deficiencies
in the officer's performance.
The Rehabilitation Act, as originally enacted, made no refer-
ence to substance abusers. After courts and administrative agencies
interpreted the Act's definition of "individual with handicaps" to
include substance abusers, however, Congress passed the 1978
amendment. 327 That amendment excluded from the Act's definition
of "individual with handicaps" substance abusers whose condition
impaired their work performance or threatened property or public
safety.
The legislative history of the Rehabilitation Act does not clearly
reveal Congress's intent in enacting the 1978 amendment. 326 On
the one hand, statements made during the floor debate suggest that
the amendment was simply a clarification that substance abusers,
like individuals with other disabilities, had to demonstrate that they
were qualified in order to invoke the protections of the Rehabili-
tation Act. 329 Regulations in force in 1978 defined qualified individ-
uals with disabilities as individuals who could perform essential job
duties once employers made reasonable accommodations to their
disabilities. 33° The statements made during the floor debate thus
imply that Congress intended the 1978 amendment to clarify that
the Rehabilitation Act protected only those substance abusers who
could perform the essential job duties once their employer made a
reasonable accommodation to their disability: In other words, Con-
3" 803 F.2d 67, 68-69 (2d Cir. 1986). See supra notes 165-67 and accompanying text
for a discussion of the Heron deciiion.
3" Pub. L. No. 95-602, f 122, 92 Stat. 2984-85 (1978) (codified in part at 29 U.S.C.
706(8)(B) (1988)).
323 See supra notes 147-60 and accompanying text for a discussion of the legislative
history of the 1978 amendment. -
'9 See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
331) 29 C.F.R. § 1613.702(f) (1990); 41 C.F.R. 1) 60-741.2 (1990); 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(k)(1)
(1989).
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gress intended that courts determine whether the Rehabilitation
Act protected a particular substance abuser in the same way that
they determined whether the Act protected an individual with any
other disability.
On the other hand, the 1978 amendment does not expressly
mention "reasonable accommodation"; it simply states the Rehabil-
itation Act's definition of "individual with handicaps" does not in-
clude any substance abuser "whose current use of alcohol or drugs
prevents such individual from performing the duties of the job in
question or whose employment, by reason of such current alcohol
or drug abuse, would constitute a direct threat in the property or
safety of others."33 ' The Conference Committee report also did not
refer to "reasonable accommodation." 352 Furthermore, Congress
did not amend the definition of "qualified individual with handi-
caps." It instead amended the definition of "individual with hand-
icaps," which suggests that Congress intended courts to completely
bypass any analysis of a particular substance abuser as a qualified
individual with a disability. Finally, because the amendment was a
response to the protection by courts of substance abusers under the
Rehabilitation Act, Congress might reasonably have intended to
limit the number of substance abusers protected by the Act.
Ultimately, the language and legislative history of the 1978
amendment provide no clear answer on how courts should deter-
mine whether the Rehabilitation Act protects a particular substance
abuser. When it enacted the ADA, Congress had the opportunity
to clearly indicate how courts should determine which substance
abusers the ADA protects. The ADA, however, fails to provide clear
guidance to the courts.
Like the Rehabilitation Act, the ADA protects only qualified
individuals with disabilities." 3 Also, as do the Rehabilitation Act
regulations, the ADA defines qualified individuals with disabilities
as persons who, with or without a reasonable accommodation to
their disability, can perform the essential functions of the job. 334
The ADA also includes, however, two provisions that specifically
address the protection of substance abusers. Section 104 provides
that the term "qualified individual with disability" does not include
°" 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(B) (1988).
334 H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1780, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 102 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 7375, 7413.
333 Pub. L. No. 101-336, tit. I, 102(a), 104 Stat. 331 (1990).
331
 Id. 1 101(8), 104 Stat. 331.
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individuals currently engaging in the illegal use of drugs." 5 The
same section ,further provides that employers may hold substance
abusers to "the same qualification standards for employment or job
performance and behavior that such [employer] holds other em-
ployees, even if any unsatisfactory performance or behavior is re-
lated to the drug use or alcoholism of such employee . . . . "336
Although the legislative history of the ADA indicates that employers
have no duty of accommodation to current users of illegal drugs, 557
the ADA does not indicate whether employers must make a reason-
able accommodation to other substance abusers before holding
them to the same standards as employees without disabilities. In
regard to substance abusers who do not use illegal drugs, such as
alcoholics, the ADA leaves open the same question as does the
Rehabilitation Act—should courts hold substance abusers seeking
protection under the acts to the same, or to a more stringent,
standard than they hold individuals with other disabilities.
In light of public concern over substance abuse, Congress cer-
tainly might have intended to require that substance abusers meet
a higher standard than individuals with other disabilities. If Con-
gress truly intended to limit the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA's
protection to only those substance abusers who can perform the
essential duties of the job without a reasonable accommodation, how-
ever, it effectively rendered the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA
meaningless for most substance abusers. Disabilities, including sub-
stance abuse, often impair job performance, especially in a world
designed for people without disabilities. That reality is implicit in
the word "disability" and is at the heart of the concept of reasonable
accommodation. 358 Therefore, if the Rehabilitation Act and the
ADA protect only those substance abusers who can perform the
essential duties of the job without a reasonable accommodation, the
Rehabilitation Act and the ADA will provide no protection for many
substance abusers.
Furthermore, the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA directly ad-
dress concerns raised by the protection of substance abusers under
the two acts. As discussed in the introduction to this note, substance
abusers differ in some important ways from individuals with other
disabilities. 859 Users of illegal drugs, for example, break the law.
333
 Id. § 104(a), 104 Stat. 334.
336 Id. § 104(c)(4), 104 Stat. 335.
337 135 CoNG. REC. 510,777 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 1989) (remarks of Sen. Harkin).
'38 See supra notes 58-64 and accompanying text.
339 Ste supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text.
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Also, the accommodations required to make substance abusers pro-
ductive members of the work force are, from the employer's per-
spective, far more complicated than building wheelchair ramps or
purchasing Braille manuals. The Rehabilitation Act and the ADA,
however, both contain provisions that directly address arguments
that many substance abusers break the law, that substance abusers
are incompetent and dangerous employees, and that reasonable
accommodations required by substance abusers are too burden-
some. Because the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA already directly
address these concerns, courts should not rely upon them as policy
reasons that support imposing a more stringent standard upon
substance abusers seeking protection under the acts than courts
impose upon individuals with other disabilities.
As noted above, substance abuse, unlike other disabilities, some-
times involves criminal activities. The ADA provides, however, that
neither the Rehabilitation Act nor the ADA protects individuals
who are currently using illegal drugs. 34° The only substance abusers
now entitled to protection under the Rehabilitation Act and the
ADA are alcoholics, individuals who abuse legal drugs, and former
users of illegal drugs. By barring those substance abusers whose
disability involves them in criminal activities from the class of sub-
stance abusers entitled to protection under the Rehabilitation Act
and the ADA, the ADA eliminates any argument that, because some
substance abusers break the law, courts should hold substance abu-
sers to a higher standard.
Another possible rationale for holding substance abusers to a
more stringent standard than individuals with other disabilities is
that substance abusers will be incompetent, or even dangerous,
employees. This argument presumes, though, that a requirement
that substance abusers be qualified would not adequately protect
the interest of employers in a productive work force. Both the
Rehabilitation Act and the ADA define qualified individuals with
disabilities as individuals who can perform the essential duties of a
job, once the employer makes a reasonable accommodation to their
310 Pub. L. No. 101-336, tit. 1, 104(a), 104 Stat. 334 (1990). The "currently engaging
in" standard will, as Senator Armstrong predicted during the floor debate on the ADA, give
rise to considerable litigation. See 136 CONG. REC. 59694 (daily ed. July 13, 1990) (remarks
of Sen. Armstrong). In providing that the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act protect only those
users of illegal drugs who have completed or are participating in rehabilitation and who are
no longer engaging in the use of drugs, Congress ignores that, for the majority of substance
abusers, rehabilitation includes relapses.
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disabilities."' If courts hold substance abusers to that standard,
employers would be free to dismiss or to refuse to hire substance
abusers who, even after the employer makes a reasonable accom-
modation to their disability, could not perform the essential duties
of the job. Furthermore, the ADA provides that courts should take
the employer's judgment into consideration when determining
which job duties are essential. 342 Courts can, therefore, protect em-
ployers who fear that they will be saddled with unproductive em-
ployees simply by requiring that, in order to bring an action under
the Rehabilitation Act or ADA, substance abusers, like individuals
with other disabilities, demonstrate that they are qualified. Congress
has already provided that the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA pro-
tect only qualified individuals with disabilities; courts need not at-
tempt to indirectly protect employers by making it more difficult
for substance abusers to bring an action under the Rehabilitation
Act.
A final rationale that courts might use to justify imposing a
more stringent standard upon substance abusers than they impose
upon individuals with other disabilities is that the accommodations
for substance abusers are exceptionally burdensome. Courts have
articulated a model of reasonable accommodation for substance
abusers that requires employers to provide employees who have
substance abuse problems with a firm choice between treatment and
discipline, to grant the employees time off to undergo rehabilitation
and to tolerate at least one relapse after employees have undergone
rehabilitation. 343 Thus, employers may have endured months of
unsatisfactory performance before the employer has met the re-
quirement for reasonable accommodation. Courts might accord-
ingly argue that they should limit the number of substance abusers
protected by the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA.
Courts articulated this model of reasonable accommodation for
substance abusers, however, in cases arising under section 501 of
the Rehabilitation Act, which prohibits discrimination by federal
employers. 344 In their decisions, the courts noted that federal agen-
cies must comply not only with the Rehabilitation Act, but also with
54 ' See id.	 101(8), 104 Stat. 331; 29 C.F.R. 1613.702(f) (1990); 41 C.F.R. 4 60-741.2
(1990); 45 C.F.R. 4 84,3(k)(1) (1989).
342 Pub. L. No. 101-336, tit. I, 	 101(8), 104 Stat. 331.
"3 See supra notes 204-34 and accompanying text for a discussion of cases applying the
concept to reasonable accommodation to substance abuse.
"4 See 29 U.S.C. ll 791(b) (1988).
December 1991] DRUG ABUSE AND DISCRIMINATION	 207
the Alcohol Rehabilitation Act. 345 In Whitlock, the first of these
reasonable accommodation cases, the court also noted that section
501 requires federal employers to take affirmative action toward
employees with substance abuse problems. 546 Neither section 504 of
the Rehabilitation Act, which prohibits discrimination on the basis
of disability by federal grantees, nor the ADA, which prohibits
discrimination on the basis of disability by most private employers,
requires employers to take affirmative action toward individuals
with disabilities. Furthermore, the Alcohol Rehabilitation Act does
not apply to federal grantees or other private employers. The prec-
edent established by Whitlock and the following cases, therefore,
need not apply in Rehabilitation Act and ADA cases involving pri-
vate employers. 347 Instead, courts may require that employers pro-
vide a far less expansive, or even completely different, type of
accommodation.
Additionally, both the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA provide
that an employer has no duty to accommodate where the accom-
modation would impose undue hardship upon the employer. 548
Even if courts use the model of reasonable accommodation devel-
oped in section 501 cases as a starting point, the undue hardship
provisions will limit the extent of accommodations that courts may
impose upon employers. Again, the ADA and the Rehabilitation
Act already directly address a concern raised by the protection of
substance abusers under the acts. No reason exists, therefore, for
courts to limit the number of substance abusers protected under
the Act by imposing a higher standard upon them than they impose
upon individuals with other disabilities.
As they decide how to determine which substance abusers the
Rehabilitation Act and the ADA protect, courts should also consider
that their determination affects not only employers, but also sub-
stance abusers who are seeking employment. Recent studies suggest
that, because jobs provide structure and an incentive to successfully
complete rehabilitation, substance abusers with jobs are more likely
than other substance abusers to avoid relapse. 349 Congress intended
345 See Walker v. Weinberger, 600 F. Supp. 757, 761 (D.D.C. 1985); Whitlock v. Donovan,
598 F. Supp. 126, 131 (D.D.C. 1984), aff'd mem. sub nom. Whitlock v. Brock, 790 F.2d 964
(D.C. Cir. 1986).
sae
	 598 F. Supp. at 136.
347 See 42 U.S.C. § 290dd-1(b)(1) (1988).
3" See Pub. L. No. 101-336, tit. 1, § 102(a), (b)(5)(a), 104 Stat. 331-32 (1990); 29 C.F.R.
ft 1613.704(a) (1990); 41 C.F.R. 4 60-741.6(d) (1990); 45 C.F.R. § 84.12(a) (1989).
3" See supra notes 32-45 and accompanying text.
208	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW 	 [Vol. 33:155
both the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA to increase the employ-
ment opportunities available to individuals with disabilities. 350 In
light of that goal, it would be particularly ironic if courts interpreted
the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA to make it more difficult for
one group of individuals with disabilities—substance abusers—who
may derive some special benefit from employment to bring an
employment discrimination claim.
One commentator has suggested that the ADA's "currently
engaging in" standard appropriately balances the interests of em-
ployers and employees who are substance abusers.35 ' The writer
concludes that the ADA's limitation of its protection to rehabilitated
or rehabilitating substance abusers not only protects the employer's
interest in maintaining a productive work force, but also encourages
substance abusers to obtain treatment.352 The writer may be overly
optimistic. Certainly, the application of the Rehabilitation Act and
the ADA to substance abusers will not discourage substance abusers
from seeking treatment. It seems unlikely, though, that prohibitions
on discrimination will actively encourage many substance abusers
to obtain treatment. If Congress truly wishes to push substance
abusers toward treatment, it should amend the Rehabilitation Act
and the ADA to provide that courts should consider the possibility
of reasonable accommodation when determining whether the Re-
habilitation Act or ADA protects a particular substance abuser. Such
an amendment would ensure that, unless the accommodation would
unduly burden the employer, employers provide employees with
substance abuse problems some opportunity to obtain treatment.
In sum, the legislative history and cases under the Rehabilita-
tion Act do not clearly indicate whether substance abusers bringing
actions under the Rehabilitation Act must meet a more stringent
standard than individuals with other disabilities. The ADA, as en-
acted, leaves the same question unanswered. Future courts faced
with deciding which substance abusers the Rehabilitation Act and
the ADA protect will, therefore, be free to take either route. These
courts should consider, however, that the Rehabilitation Act and .
the ADA already address many of the concerns raised by the pro-
tection of substance abusers under those acts. Neither the Rehabil-
'5° See supra notes 50-52 and 278-79 for a discussion of the purposes of, respectively,
the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA.
3" Henderson, supra note 156, at 735-36. See supra notes 310-14 and accompanying
text for a discussion of Henderson's article.
'" Henderson, supra note 156, at 735-36.
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itation Act nor the ADA protects users of illegal drugs. Additionally,
employers' interests in a productive work force are adequately pro-
tected by the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA, which require sub-
stance abusers invoking the protections of the acts to demonstrate
that they are qualified. The Rehabilitation Act and ADA also pro-
vide . that employers have no duty- of accommodation where the
accommodation would unduly burden the employer. Finally, courts
should consider the important role that employment may play in
the recovery of substance abusers.
VI. CONCLUSION
Both the courts and administrative agencies that interpreted
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 included substance abusers in the
Act's definition of "individual with handicaps." Congress ratified
that interpretation by expressing its intent to include substance
abusers in the ADA's definition of "individuals with disabilities."
Unfortunately, Congress also included in the Rehabilitation Act and
the ADA provisions that can be, and, in the case of the Rehabilita-
tion Act, have been, interpreted to make it more difficult for sub-
stance abusers than for individuals with other disabilities to obtain
protection under the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA.
No reason exists, however, for courts to treat substance abusers
differently from individuals with other disabilities. The Rehabilita-
tion Act and the ADA already include provisions that directly ad-
dress concerns raised by the protection of substance abusers under
the acts. Ideally, Congress will amend both the Rehabilitation Act
and the ADA to state clearly that courts should apply the same
standards to substance abusers and individuals with other disabili-
ties. Until Congress takes such action, courts should apply the same
standards to all individuals bringing claims under the Rehabilitation
Act and the ADA.
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